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This Article was inspired by exercises that took place in Umatilla 
County, Oregon, as part of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP), a federal government program 
designed to protect local populations from the danger posed by 
hazardous releases on federal lands.1  The Oregon CSEPP site is one 
of six locations where the nation’s chemical weapons are stockpiled.2  
The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) 
designs and delivers HSEEP-compliant, emergency preparedness 
exercises, which are conducted annually at all CSEPP sites.3  The 
exercises simulate both a chemical release from a CSEPP site and the 
measures that would have to be taken to safeguard the public.  The 
simulations focus primarily on emergency evacuation and steps to be 
taken directly following the release.  However, these simulations do 
not address long-term recovery from a release or the scenario where a 
natural disaster or a negligent act by the government or a third party 
causes the chemical release.  Hazardous releases may take a number 
of forms.4  Far from unique to CSEPP, there are well over 4000 
different federal government properties containing hazardous waste, 
which, at a minimum, threaten to release hazardous substances and 
must be cleaned up.5 
 
1 See FEMA, Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), 
http://fema.gov/government/grant/csepp.shtm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).  See generally 50 
U.S.C.A. § 1521 (West 2009). 
2 FEMA, supra note 1. 
3 See FEMA, About HSEEP, https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_About.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2010); FEMA, 2009 ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
DIRECTORATE (2009), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/npd 
_operating.pdf. 
4 See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Idaho 2003), 
modified in part sub nom. United States v. Asarco Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Idaho 
2005); Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 858 (2008). 
5 Charles de Saillan, The Use of Imminent Hazard Provisions of Environmental Laws to 
Compel Cleanup at Federal Facilities, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 46 (2008). 
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In some facilities, plans are in place to address the contingency of a 
release.  For example, the CSEPP Incident Response Action Plan for 
the Greater Umatilla Community (Response Plan), promulgated in 
2004 and revised in 2009,6 directs what should happen if there is a 
chemical incident at the Umatilla Army Depot (UMAD), and testing 
of the Response Plan takes place regularly.  The Response Plan 
includes policies and procedures for recovery and restoration, which 
provide guidance for recovery under the following provisions: 
23. Local jurisdictions will pursue options to insure that area 
citizens, businesses, and governmental agencies are made 
whole by the [f]ederal [g]overnment to include: reimbursement 
for lost or reduced property values, lost or reduced tax 
revenues, lost or reduced markets, and lost or reduced business 
opportunities, and lost or reduced income. 
24. The federal government will be responsible for all off post 
actions and costs associated with restoration and recovery of 
federal property within the impacted event footprint.  The 
federal government will not allow their properties to become a 
threat to surrounding properties and work expeditiously to 
ensure restoration and recovery are completed in coordination 
with local activities. 
25. The treaty rights of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla 
Indian Reservation and the provisions of the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the Archeological 
Protect Act [sic] will be observed as they apply Recovery and 
Restoration activities.7 
The Response Plan assumes that the Governor has requested and 
the President has declared an emergency or a disaster, and that the 
federal government will be responsible for all costs incurred by local 
governments, businesses, and others if the release of chemical agent 
results in a community level event.8  In fact, steps must be taken in 
 
6 CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, CSEPP INCIDENT 
RESPONSE ACTION PLAN FOR THE GREATER UMATILLA COMMUNITY (2009), available at 
http://www.csepp.org/sites/csepp.org/files/CSEPP_Plan_6-19-2009.pdf. 
7 Id. at 207. 
8 Id. at 205–07.  CSEPP maintains a website describing the risk of severe earthquakes 
and other “acts of God” for the area surrounding the UMAD.  CSEPP, Local Hazards, 
http://www.csepp.net/frdismain.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).  See Department of 
Defense’s Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program [CSEPP]: Hearing 
Before the Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Government Operations, 103d Cong. 206 (1993) (responses by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) to questions from Mike Synar, Chairman, Environment, 
Energy, and Natural Resources Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations), 
for more information concerning such risks. 
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order to declare an emergency or disaster.9  Also, whether the federal 
government will be responsible for the costs of cleanup and recovery 
depends on the actions the affected entities take in the wake of a 
chemical release.  Possible claims may include negligence or other 
acts or omissions by a federal government employee, a government 
contractor, and third parties.10  This Article will focus on the tort of 
negligence and other torts common to toxic harm recovery claims.11 
The purpose of this Article is to describe the legal options a local 
government, private individual, or business might pursue to recover 
from a chemical release at a federal facility caused by an emergency 
or disaster, as defined by law, or by the negligence of federal 
personnel, government contractors, or third parties.  The first avenue 
of recovery is most likely the Stafford Act.12  However, eligibility 
under the Act is not automatic, and quick action is required.13 
Additionally, remedies under the Stafford Act are limited.14  Military 
administrative remedies, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and 
the Military Claims Act (MCA) may also be sources of remedies for 
personal injury or property damage.15  Injunctive relief is provided 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).16  CERCLA allows for the clean up of 
any contamination from the release and is necessary to pay for the 
long-term and expensive process of restoring natural resources and 
protecting human health.17  Cultural resources may also be impacted, 
 
9 See infra notes 28–55 and accompanying text outlining the FEMA process to obtain 
disaster or emergency relief. 
10 One early example is that of a military plane crashing into the Empire State Building.  
Empire State Building Sustained Crash, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/us/story?id 
=92525&page=1 (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).  See Molony v. Boy Comic Publishers, 98 
N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (1950).  Previous examples of acts that might have triggered legal 
claims at UMAD include a 2004 event when a fire was started in the rocket shear machine 
during decentralization of M55 rockets.  Press Release, U.S. Army Chem. Materials 
Agency, Rocket Fire at the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (Dec. 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.ucem.us/pressreleases/05Releases/05Dec7_RocketFire.pdf. 
11 A “tort” is a civil wrong or injury for which the court will provide a remedy in the 
form of damages.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009). 
12 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 5121–5208 (West 2009). 
13 See 44 C.F.R. § 206.36 (2009). 
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 5193 (2006). 
15 See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–80 (2006); Military 
Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2006). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c) (2006). 
17 See id. § 9606(a). 
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and implementation of the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA) may be needed to protect our national heritage.18  The 
constraints of these statutes require careful planning to ensure the 
possibility of sufficient recovery.  Also, the interaction of the different 
statutes presents a legal challenge because enforcing rights under one 
statute may bar recovery under another.19 
Ambiguous guidance regarding the response to a chemical release 
can cause the kinds of difficulties and provoke criticisms of the kind 
experienced in the response to Hurricane Katrina.20  Further, the 
hazardous substances involved in these incidents trigger legal 
constraints among the applicable statutes.  Recently, the CSEPP 
produced a resource on how to seek federal assistance for those who 
might experience injury or loss in the event of a release of chemical 
weapons agent from one of the storage installations in the continental 
United States.21  As a topical outline of available assistance, the guide 
is helpful because it provides a wider scope of recovery options than 
this Article covers, such as crop insurance and recovery for 
noninsured crops and livestock forage, and also some parameters of 
the options available.  However, it does not give the user an in-depth 
look at limitations of these different means of recovery.  This Article 
was written in an effort to assist local governments, businesses, and 
private individuals as they navigate the legal remedies for losses 
suffered after a chemical release.22 
 
18 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x–6 (2006). 
19 See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
20 See Jillian L. Morrison, Post-Disaster Contracting: An Examination of the Costs 
Associated with the Stafford Act’s Local Contracting Preference and Implementation 
Proposals to Maximize Community Revitalization, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 687, 693 (2008); 
ARGONNE NAT’L LAB. DECISION & INFO. SCIS. DIV., CSEPP RECOVERY PLAN 
WORKBOOK (2003), available at http://emc.ornl.gov/CSEPPweb/PDF/CSEPP_Recovery 
_Plan_Workbook_April_2003.doc (giving vague guidance regarding the CSEPP while 
failing to identify significant legal issues and questions that must be addressed when 
processing claims). 
21 CHEM. STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, GUIDE FOR ASSISTANCE 
AND COMPENSATION FOLLOWING A CHEMICAL EVENT 6 (2009). 
22 This Article does not cover criminal or terrorist acts; however, footnote material in 
this Article does refer to such events.  Especially since September 11th, there are statutes, 
case law, and treatises distinguishing terrorism from crimes or comparing the two.  In 
2003, Rinaldo Campana noted CSEPP sites as potential targets available for terrorists to 
exploit.  Rinaldo Campana, President, C5 Group, Inc., Former Chief, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Countermeasures Unit, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (HQ), Responding to an 
Incident Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction-An Overview, Speech Presented at the 
30th National Spring Conference of the Environment Sponsored by the ABA Standing 
Committee on Environmental Law (Apr. 12, 2002), in 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 249, 249  
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(2003).  According to Campana, the U.S. government “had always considered an airplane 
attack into an igloo containing these chemical stockpiles as a major vulnerability even 
before the September 11th incident.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit has also recognized the 
importance of including terrorism as a risk when assessing risk of harm to resources.  San 
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th 
Cir. 2006).  The court found that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s categorical refusal 
under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) to consider environmental 
effects of a possible terrorist attack on a proposed interim spent fuel storage installation on 
Diablo Canyon nuclear facility was generally not reasonable.  Id.  The court reasoned that 
the agency in other contexts did not view the risk of terrorist attacks to be insignificant, 
precise quantification of risk was not necessary to trigger NEPA’s requirements, the 
agency did not adequately show that risk of terrorist attack was unquantifiable, and it was 
possible to conduct low-probability, high-consequence analysis.  Id.  Army intelligence 
components engaged in civil disturbance activities, such as terrorist attacks, would do so in 
accordance with civil disturbance plan Garden Plot.  DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. 
NO. 381-10, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 4 (2007), 
available at http://www.army.mil/USAPA/epubs/pdf/r381_10.pdf. 
 Also, criminal penalties of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006), provide remedies for intentional acts related to hazardous 
waste.  42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3025.15, MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (1997), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ 
directives/corres/pdf/302515p.pdf; DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3025.12, MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS) (1994), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302512p.pdf.  In United States v. Hoflin, 
880 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ocean Shores, Washington, Public Works 
Director ordered employees to bury on the grounds of the City’s sewage treatment plant 
barrels containing paint left over from road maintenance and sludge removed from the 
kitchen of the City’s golf course.  The Ninth Circuit upheld criminal conviction of the 
Public Works Director for violating RCRA by disposing of the paint without having 
obtained a permit.  Id. at 1040.  Lack of knowledge of a permit is not an essential element 
of the crime the conviction was based on; rather, proper conviction results from knowingly 
treating, storing, or disposing of any hazardous waste without having obtained a permit or 
in knowing violation of the permit.  Id. at 1036. 
 These RCRA provisions have been applied to federal facilities’ operations.  As United 
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), illustrates, Army civilian employees were 
subject to criminal conviction for RCRA violations.  In Dee, the indictment charged the 
defendants with violating RCRA by illegally storing, treating, and disposing of hazardous 
wastes at the Pilot Plant.  Id. at 743.  They were convicted of multiple violations of 
RCRA’s criminal provisions for illegally storing, treating, and disposing of hazardous 
wastes.  Id.  The defendants first asserted that they were immune from criminal 
prosecution under RCRA because of their status as federal employees working at a federal 
facility.  Id. at 744.  However, “sovereign immunity does not attach to individual 
government employees so as to immunize them from prosecution for their criminal acts.”  
Id. (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974)).  RCRA provisions require the 
U.S. Department of Justice to deputize Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
employees to serve as special deputy U.S. Marshals with respect to violations of RCRA’s 
criminal provisions.  42 U.S.C. § 6979b (2006). 
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I 
EMERGENCY AND DISASTER RECOVERY FOR EARLY RELIEF 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency and 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)23 governs how the federal government 
can assist communities recovering from emergencies and disasters.  In 
doing so, the Stafford Act provides immediate assistance in the form 
of both activity and financial relief.24  The statute defines “major 
disaster” as a natural catastrophe including hurricanes, tsunamis, 
earthquakes, and, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in 
any part of the United States or U.S. territories that the President 
determines warrants major disaster assistance.25  Federal assistance 
supplements the available resources of the state and local 
governments and disaster relief organizations.26  An “emergency” 
means any “occasion or instance for which, in the determination of 
the President, [f]ederal assistance is needed to supplement [s]tate and 
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and 
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a 
catastrophe in any part of the United States.”27  The statute also 
applies where the federal government has primary authority for 
response pursuant to federal law, that is, areas where the federal 
government has exclusive, concurrent, or proprietary jurisdiction.28 
In order to apply for assistance under the Stafford Act, there must 
be a declaration of a major disaster or an emergency.29  When a 
chemical release occurs that the state determines may be beyond the 
state and local government’s capacity to respond, the state will 
request the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 
23 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121–5208 (West 2009). 
24 Id. §§ 5121–63. 
25 Id. § 5122(2)–(3). 
26 Id. § 5122(2). 
27 Id. § 5122(1). 
28 Such jurisdiction existed over the Murrah Federal Building in the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing.  EUGENE BAIME ET AL., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 451–53 (John 
Rawcliffe & Jeannine Smith eds., 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ 
law0806.pdf, cited in Christopher B. Walters, Responding to National Disasters and 
Emergencies: A Contract and Fiscal Law Primer, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2007, at 35, 36.  
Walters’ article identifies key sources to federal contracting law for response to national 
disasters and emergencies, including the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. 
pt. 18 (2009), and the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2006).  Walters, supra, passim. 
29 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191 (2006). 
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regional director to do a joint state-FEMA preliminary assessment.30  
A preliminary damage assessment must be done “to determine the 
impact and magnitude of damage and the resulting unmet needs of 
individuals, businesses, the public sector, and the community as a 
whole.”31  This information is used by the state as a basis for the 
Governor’s request and by FEMA to document its recommendation to 
the President.  The Governor also submits requests for the local 
government, which includes counties, municipalities, and Indian 
tribes.32 
A request for major disaster declaration must be made within thirty 
days of the occurrence of the release.33  When a release occurs or 
threatens to occur in a state, which would not qualify as a major 
disaster, the Governor may request an emergency declaration.34  The 
request must be submitted within five days after the need for 
assistance becomes apparent, but no more than thirty days after the 
release.35  The FEMA Associate Director determines and designates 
the types of assistance to be made available and the disaster-affected 
areas eligible for supplementary federal assistance under the Stafford 
Act.36 
Upon declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the President, 
Director, or Associate Director will appoint a federal coordinating 
officer and the Governor will appoint a state coordinating officer to 
coordinate the state and local efforts with the federal government.37  
The state and FEMA directors will enter into a FEMA-state 
agreement stating “the understandings, commitments, and conditions 
for assistance under which FEMA disaster assistance shall be 
provided.”38  There is no dollar amount or time limit on federal 
 
30 44 C.F.R. § 206.33 (2009). 
31 Id. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 5122(7).  There have been calls for a statutory amendment to set tribes 
apart for Stafford Act funding so that they do not have to go through the state to receive 
such assistance from the federal government.  See Courtney A. Stouff, Comment, Native 
Americans and Homeland Security: Failure of the Homeland Security Act to Recognize 
Tribal Sovereignty, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 375, 389–93 (2003). 
33 44 C.F.R. § 206.36.  A denial of emergency or disaster declaration may be appealed 
to the President.  Id. § 206.46. 
34 Id. § 206.35. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. § 206.39. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 5143 (2006). 
38 44 C.F.R. § 206.44(a) (2009). 
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assistance available for a major disaster.39  Assistance is limited to 
$5,000,000 for a single emergency, and the President must report to 
Congress when the limit is exceeded, but more is needed.40  In that 
case, the President must determine if emergency assistance is 
immediately needed because there is a continuing and immediate risk 
to lives, property, public health or safety, and necessary assistance 
will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis.41  The various types 
of assistance available under the Stafford Act include: (1) temporary 
housing assistance for individuals and households;42 (2) financial 
assistance for medical care, transportation, or other services needed 
by individuals and households;43 (3) grants of up to $10,000 for 
individuals or families;44 (4) crisis counseling45 and disaster legal 
services for low income individuals;46 and (5) various other forms of 
assistance to public facilities.47  The President may also loan up to 
$5,000,000 to local governments that suffer a substantial loss of tax 
and other revenue as a result of a major disaster.48 
Especially following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA funds are also 
supposed to provide an economic stimulus to the affected local 
economy.  When allocating FEMA funds to private firms under 
contract for “debris clearance, distribution of supplies, reconstruction, 
and other major disaster or emergency assistance activities . . . 
preference shall be given, to the extent feasible and practicable, to 
those organizations, firms, and individuals residing or doing business 
primarily in the area affected” by the disaster or emergency.49  
Apparently, this type of allocation did not occur in the wake of 
 
39 See id. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 5193 (2006). 
41 Id. § 5193(2)(b)–(c). 
42 44 C.F.R. § 206.101. 
43 Id. § 206.119(b)(1)–(2). 
44 Id. § 206.131(a). 
45 Id. § 206.171. 
46 Id. § 206.164. 
47 Id. § 206.220-.228.  More information and directions on how to obtain financial 
assistance to recover from disasters under the Stafford Act and other sources may be found 
in the introduction to Oregon’s Disaster Recovery Assistance Guidebook.  OR. 
EMERGENCY MGMT., OR. MILITARY DEP’T, DISASTER RECOVERY ASSISTANCE 
GUIDEBOOK (2007), available at http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/fin_rec/disaster 
_recover_guide.shtml. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 5184 (2006). 
49 Id. § 5150(a)(1); see 48 C.F.R. §§ 26.200–.205 (2009); see also Walters, supra note 
28, at 39. 
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Hurricane Katrina.50  The underutilization of local contractor 
preference after Hurricane Katrina caused a reevaluation of this 
preference, which demonstrated a tension in the Stafford Act’s policy 
goals.51  On the one hand, the federal government is to provide quick, 
efficient, cost-effective emergency response; on the other, 
implementing the socioeconomic goal of revitalizing the community 
using federal procurement preferences restrains the market from 
responding quickly with the needed goods and services.52  Hence, 
effective preplanning is necessary for successful community 
revitalization.53 
There are significant limitations to the Stafford Act.  While an 
important first step, the immediate assistance of the Stafford Act is 
limited by a relatively short application period and a capped 
allowance of government funds.54  Also, under the Stafford Act, a 
chemical release that is not caused by a natural disaster is not 
guaranteed to be declared a major disaster or an emergency.55  Since 
FEMA’s determination of Stafford Act assistance eligibility is 
discretionary and not reviewable,56 remedies for a chemical release 
are not assured.57  For this reason, in cases where federal facilities 
 
50 Walters, supra note 28, at 42. 
51 See Morrison, supra note 20, at 687. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5170b (2006) (focusing federal efforts on assistance essential 
to meeting immediate threats to life and property); id. § 5174(h) (limiting financial 
assistance to individuals and households); id. § 5178 (limiting grants to individuals).  A 
useful component of a CSEPP exercise might be to identify case studies detailing the cost 
of recovery where FEMA was used to recover from a chemical incident. 
55 See Kansas ex rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797, 798–99 (D. Kan. 
1990), reconsideration dismissed, 751 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Kan. 1990), and aff’d, 953 F.2d 
1392 (10th Cir. 1992). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006).  Even though assistance under the Stafford Act is not 
guaranteed by the statute, at least one statute does appear to rely on the Stafford Act to 
provide a source of assistance.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1521 (West 2009).  In the example given 
above regarding the CSEPP, aid ends on the completion date of grants and cooperative 
agreements, with respect to the facility entered into pursuant to the statute, and 180 days 
after completion of the destruction of the stockpile even if there are latent effects.  Id. § 
1521(c)(5)(B).  The CSEPP statute requires the FEMA Director to carry out a program to 
provide assistance responding to emergencies involving risks to public health or safety that 
the Secretary identifies as being risks resulting from the storage of chemical agents or the 
destruction of such agents and munitions.  Id. § 1521(c)(5)(A). 
57 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1521(c)(4).  Pursuant to § 1521(c)(4), the Department of the Army 
(Army) and FEMA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the Army 
provides funds to FEMA to support the CSEPP mission of assisting state and local  
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carry the risk of a chemical incident, legislation, in the form of an 
amendment to the Stafford Act, would likely provide the best means 
to assure major disaster or emergency assistance under this statute.  
This solution would be particularly appropriate for federal facilities in 
the United States that carry out statutory functions, such as a chemical 
weapons incineration program that already provides for warning 
assistance and other formal community protection measures.58  Also, 
in addition to offering only limited funds at the outset of an 
emergency, the Stafford Act is not designed to address the long-term 
remediation of natural resources that is necessary for the protection of 
human health and the revitalization of commercial production.59  Nor 
does this statute provide a cause of action for an individual or a local 
government to bring an administrative claim;60 assert criminal 
penalties where appropriate;61 or obtain a remedy against the federal 
government,62 a private contractor, or any other entity that could be 
held responsible for its role in the release. 
 
governments in carrying out the functions relating to off-post emergency preparedness and 
response in the communities surrounding military installations that store and dispose of 
lethal chemical agents and munitions.  FEMA, FISCAL YEAR 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (2008), available at 
https://www.cseppportal.net/SiteCollectionDocuments/2008_CSEPP_Report_to_Congress
.pdf.  In 2006, Congress passed legislation effective April 1, 2007, that placed CSEPP 
back within FEMA’s role.  See Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 
(SAFE Port Act), Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 6, 33, and 46 U.S.C.). 
58 See generally SAFE Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884.  The Department 
of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, which requires the Army to provide maximum 
protection for the environment and the general public in destroying the nation’s chemical 
warfare agent stockpile, does not provide an implied private right of action just because it 
is mandatory in tone and was passed to benefit the general public.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1521; 
Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1493 
(10th Cir. 1997). 
59 The President delegated authority to adjudicate CERCLA emergency response 
claims to the EPA.  Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987).  The EPA 
has claims procedures for use by commercial entities and individuals and other procedures 
applicable to reimbursements sought by local governments.  See generally ENVTL. 
APPEALS BD., REVISED GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES FOR SUBMISSION AND REVIEW OF 
CERCLA SECTION 106(B) REIMBURSEMENT PETITIONS (2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/eab/cercla-guidance2004.pdf.  EPA claims procedures require the 
claimant to first pursue reimbursement from the responsible party.  40 C.F.R. § 307.30 
(2009).  Therefore, if the release occurred on a military installation, the claimant should 
first make a demand on that military department. 
60 See infra Part II.G for information regarding claims against military departments. 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 5157 (2006). 
62 See id. § 5148 (identifying a cause of action for misuse of Stafford Act funds, not the 
underlying act causing the emergency or disaster); id. § 5156.  Claims against the federal  
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II 
BARRIERS TO RECOVERY FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND 
WAYS TO OVERCOME THEM 
Given the Stafford Act’s limitations, individuals and entities, 
including local governments, businesses, and individual persons, need 
other tools to recover from the federal government and the contractor.  
Both federal and state laws provide either a means of recovery or 
protective measures for resources damaged by a chemical release.  In 
federal law, statutory remedies come as a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.63  A statutory waiver of sovereign immunity also enables 
recovery under state law.64 
A.  Barrier to Recovery: Unitary Executive 
Enforcing legal liability against the United States raises barriers 
that do not exist in private disputes.  In particular, the doctrines of 
unitary executive and sovereign immunity could prevent enforcing the 
legal liability of the federal government in a chemical release from a 
federal facility.  A major legal obstacle in compelling the cleanup of 
federal facilities has been the unitary executive theory.65  This theory, 
which has been advocated since the 1980s, holds that the entire 
executive branch of the federal government is one legal entity, and 
therefore one federal agency or department cannot sue another.66  The 
basis for this theory is that any dispute within the executive branch 
can be resolved by the President, so there is no amenable case or 
controversy for the court to resolve.67  Under the unitary executive 
theory, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cannot bring a 
judicial enforcement action against a sister federal agency such as the 
Department of Defense (DOD).68  Though the Justice Department has 
conceded that the EPA may assess civil penalties against other federal 
 
government would be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1346(b)(1), 2671–80 (2006), though such claims are barred where the government actor is 
exercising a discretionary function.  Id. § 2680(a). 
63 See St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 314–18 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
64 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 319 (Or. 2006). 
65 See de Saillan, supra note 5, at 77.  See also STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 42, 158–59 (1996). 
66 DYCUS, supra note 65.  See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
67 Myers, 272 U.S. at 135; see also de Saillan, supra note 5, at 77. 
68 De Saillan, supra note 5, at 77. 
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agencies in administrative proceedings outside the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts,69 in the thirty-seven years that the EPA has been in 
existence it has never initiated a judicial action against any other 
federal agency.70  The difficulty posed by the unitary executive theory 
is particularly apparent in the cleanup of federal facilities.  Even if the 
EPA does want to force a federal agency to clean up a federal facility, 
Department of Justice policy prevents the EPA from bringing actions 
against another agency.71 
Though a dominant legal theory, especially during the past 
administration, the unitary executive theory has critics.72  The 
Constitution does not inhibit, and even invites, the three branches to 
share power in creative ways.73  Additionally, Congressional acts 
providing for enforcement by the EPA or other federal executive 
bodies against federal agencies provide a legislative basis to assist in 
recovery following a chemical release. 
B.  Barrier to Recovery: Sovereign Immunity 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is another U.S. legal doctrine 
presenting long-held barriers to filing suit against the United States.  
Sovereign immunity is a principle of law, inherited from England and 
rigidly applied in the United States, which states that no suit may be 
brought against the sovereign without his consent.74  Only Congress 
 
69 Id. (citing 21 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 109 (1997)). 
70 Id.  Consider one court’s take on the situation: 
To ensure the President’s [authority] over the Executive Branch, the Constitution 
and its judicial gloss vests [the President] with the powers of appointment and 
removal, the power to demand written opinions from executive officers. . . . In the 
particular case of EPA, Presidential authority is clear since it has never been 
considered an “independent agency,” but always part of the Executive Branch. 
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405–06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). 
71 See Colorado v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo. 1989).  
For more discussion of federal cleanups and CERCLA, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, 
Challenges to Federal Facility Cleanups and CERCLA Section 113(h), 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
353, 360 (1995). 
72 Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1737 (1996).  
Opinions of a divided U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate the tension between legal theories 
related to control one branch may exercise over another.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988). 
73 Flaherty, supra note 72, at 1737 n.47 (referring to U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
White’s position regarding the separation of powers). 
74 United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1940). 
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can waive the immunity of the United States,75 and legislative 
enactments granting the waiver generally are construed strictly.76  
Historically, due to sovereign immunity, the United States 
government has not been held legally responsible for the torts of its 
employees, at the expense of the innocent victims of those torts.77  
According to one infamous example, in 1945 a U.S. Army bomber 
airplane, piloted by a serviceman flying low over New York, struck 
the Empire State Building killing and seriously injuring a number of 
people and causing extensive property damage.78  The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity prevented the victims from recovering any 
damages from the U.S. government.79 
C.  Overcoming Sovereign Immunity: The Federal Tort Claims Act 
Twelve months after the airplane crash into the Empire State 
Building, the FTCA became law.80  The FTCA constitutes a broad 
waiver of the immunity of the United States from suit in tort.  It 
conferred jurisdiction upon the U.S. district courts over claims for 
damages resulting from: 
[I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.81 
However, there are several statutory and common law exceptions to 
the FTCA.82  When a claim is not barred by one of these exceptions 
and state law would provide a remedy for the claim if it had been 
brought against a private party in state court, individuals, states, 
 
75 Id. 
76 McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951). 
77 See, e.g., The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922). 
78 The statute that became the FTCA was under consideration and underwent various 
revisions for nearly thirty years prior to this crash.  Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 
24 n.9 (1953), overruled in part by Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). 
79 1–2 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS § 2.01 (2009); Comm’rs of the State Ins. Fund v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 549, 
551 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (implementing the newly enacted FTCA and recounting subsequent 
recovery by victims of the Empire State Building incident). 
80 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–80 (2006). 
81 Id. § 1346(b). 
82 See infra Part II.D. 
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counties, municipalities, and like political entities may institute an 
action against the United States in district court.83 
After exhausting the administrative remedy,84 the claimant may 
seek to recover from a tort by filing a complaint in federal court under 
the FTCA.  For private actors, federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over civil actions based on claims arising under the 
FTCA,85 and these actions must be brought in the jurisdiction where 
the plaintiff resides or the tortious event occurred.86  Although there 
are no punitive damages available under the statute,87 the FTCA 
permits recovery of compensatory and pecuniary damages for damage 
or loss to property, personal injury, and death.88  The amounts 
permitted in settlements under the FTCA are limited.  U.S. Attorneys 
are authorized to settle claims for an amount up to $1,000,000, and in 
some cases more.89  It is important to note that the FTCA provides 
damages for injuries, not reimbursement for response costs.  In one 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that, where the 
U.S. Forest Service caused a forest fire and the state expended over 
$25,000 to fight and extinguish the fire, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction under the FTCA to award damages because the state did 
not claim injury or loss of property.90 
 
83 See 1–5 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 5.03[6]; United States v. 
Washington, 351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965) (states); Oregon ex rel. State Forester v. United 
States, 308 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1962) (states); Cascade County, Mont. v. United States, 75 
F. Supp. 850 (D. Mont. 1948) (counties); City of San Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 
498 (9th Cir. 1980) (municipalities); Lakeland R-3 Sch. Dist. v. United States, 546 F. 
Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (like political entities). 
84 The FTCA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing a negligence 
action “for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any [federal employee] while acting within the scope of his 
office or employment.”  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 
(1993).  The claimant must file within six months after the final denial of the claim.  If the 
agency fails to act within six months after receiving the administrative claim, the claimant 
may sue in the district court without waiting for final agency action.  The United States is 
the proper defendant, not the federal agency involved.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). 
85 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
86 Id. § 1402(b). 
87 Id. § 2674. 
88 See 2–10 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 10.04 (listing damages awarded 
by different courts in FTCA actions).  An award may be reduced by comparative 
negligence attributable to the plaintiff.  Id. 
89 28 C.F.R. pt. 0, subpt. Y, app. (2009). 
90 Oregon ex rel. State Forester v. United States, 308 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1962).  
The state sued under a statute that characterized the cost as a debt rather than a tort.  Id.  A 
similar statute today is chapter 477.068 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, which requires  
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D.  Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
There are several express exceptions to the FTCA that present 
barriers as absolute as sovereign immunity.  With limited exception, 
the FTCA permits suit only on claims for “injury or loss of property, 
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the [g]overnment while acting within 
the scope of his office or employment.”91  Statutory exceptions are 
explicitly listed at 28 U.S.C. § 2680, and some of these are discussed 
below.  Among the exceptions to the FTCA, the discretionary 
function exception is the most frequently used and perhaps poses the 
highest hurdle.92 
1.  Discretionary Function 
Under the FTCA, the federal government is free from liability for 
negligent acts or omissions regarded as discretionary functions.93  
These exclusions include claims arising from the performance of 
discretionary functions or duties.94  The purpose of the exclusion is to 
“‘prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through 
the medium of an action in tort.’”95  Decisions involving the 
allocation and deployment of limited governmental resources are the 
 
anyone causing a forest fire to pay the cost of extinguishing it.  OR. REV. STAT. § 477.068 
(2009).  Still, “authority exists that if contamination causes actual property damage, and 
thus a valid cause of action under the FTCA, the cost of removing the contamination may 
be considered a measure of damages to the property.”  Millard, Disaster Claims: Claims 
for Emergency Response Services, ARMY LAW., July 1995, at 72, 74 (citing New York v. 
United States, 620 F. Supp. 374, 378 (D.C.N.Y. 1985)). 
91 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
92 Id. § 2680(a). 
93 Id.; Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), overruled in part by Rayonier, Inc. 
v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (concerning an element not related to the 
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)); United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 
(1984).  There is also an exception for intentional torts.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
94 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
95 Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988) (quoting 
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814).  The West synopsis of the case explains: 
[D]iscretionary function exception to [FTCA] did not bar claim alleging that, under 
authority granted by regulations, the Food and Drug Administration adopted policy 
of testing all lots of oral polio vaccine for compliance with safety standards and 
preventing the public distribution of any lot that failed to comply, and that, 
notwithstanding that mandatory policy, FDA knowingly approved release of unsafe 
lot. 
Id.; see also 2-11 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 11.02. 
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type of administrative judgment that the discretionary function 
exception was designed to immunize from suit.96  The U.S. Supreme 
Court employs a two-step analysis to determine whether the 
challenged conduct falls within the discretionary function exception.  
First, the Court determines whether the challenged actions “‘involve 
an element of judgment or choice.’”97  This requires an inquiry into 
the nature of the conduct, not the status of the actor.98  This 
requirement is not satisfied where a “‘federal statute, regulation, or 
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to 
follow.’”99  If an element of choice or judgment is involved, the Court 
employs step two of the analysis: determining whether the judgment 
is of the kind that the discretionary function was designed to shield.100  
Only those “‘decisions grounded in social, economic, and political 
policy’” will be protected by the discretionary function exception.101 
There are many examples of cases where the courts have 
determined whether the discretionary function barred suit against the 
federal government under the FTCA, and some of these cases involve 
federal facilities.  The discretionary function exception to the waiver 
of sovereign immunity under the FTCA barred claims against the 
United States concerning a contaminated ninety-three acre site at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado.102  The Tenth Circuit found 
that how the Army, Shell, and the EPA “were to go about containing 
the spread of contamination before further damage could occur while 
still protecting public health touched on policy choices, not the least 
of which involved the ‘translation’ of CERCLA’s general health and 
 
96 Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998), cited in Graham v. 
FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring additional findings to support 
sovereign immunity defense where disaster relief applicants sued FEMA for ending an 
individual and family grant program despite declaration that the states were a major 
disaster area and FEMA’s obligation to pay states for noncancellable costs incurred by 
states before the termination date). 
97 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 
536). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). 
100 Id. at 322–23. 
101 Id. at 323 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814). 
102 Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
residents in an area adjoining a CERCLA hazardous waste cleanup site sued the Army for 
damage allegedly caused by airborne pollutants released during joint cleanup by the Army 
and Shell Oil). 
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safety provisions into ‘concrete plans.’”103  However, the 
discretionary function did not bar suit in Starrett v. United States, 
where the plaintiffs, who owned and lived on land adjacent to a naval 
submarine base in Washington State, alleged that chemicals produced 
during the demilitarization of missiles leached into the groundwater 
and entered their well water.104  To overcome the discretionary 
function, the Starrett court stated that the landowners would have to 
show that the government violated a “specific mandatory” 
requirement.105  The landowners contended that the provisions of four 
regulations, including an executive order, C.F.R. provisions, a naval 
document on waste disposal, and the Navy’s 1957 Manual on Naval 
Preventative Medicine, were specific and mandatory requirements.  
The court found that the executive order constituted the required 
specific and mandatory direction to the Navy and did not consider the 
other regulations.106  In Soldano v. United States, the discretionary 
function did not shield the National Park Service from suit for 
establishing a thirty-five miles per hour speed limit at a location 
where the road’s stopping-sight distance was no greater than 180 feet, 
and standards specified a speed limit of no more than twenty-five 
miles per hour for roads like the one in question.107  The variety of 
documents used in Starrett show that, to avoid dismissal based on 
discretionary function exception, full discovery of documents is 
necessary to find any directives related to procedures followed or not 
followed before a chemical release. 
2.  Exclusive Remedy Provision 
The FTCA also provides that any remedy against the United States 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) is exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding for money damages.108  The trend of court decisions has 
 
103 Id. at 1538 (citing Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1427 (10th Cir. 1987)).  
The FTCA discretionary function exception applied to decisions made regarding how to 
clean up the site, but under Colorado law, the plaintiffs did have a claim against Shell, the 
contractor, that cleanup of a ninety-three acre toxic lake was an abnormally dangerous 
activity possibly leading to strict liability for damages.  Id. at 1543. 
104 847 F.2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 1988). 
105 Id. at 541. 
106 Id. (indicating that there is a presumption of discretionary immunity when a statute 
or regulation permits the exercise of choice at an operational level; however, this can be 
overcome where there is a showing that safety concerns were not adequately considered). 
107 453 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2006). 
108 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006). 
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been to hold that the existence of another remedy against the United 
States, apart from the FTCA, does not itself preclude suit under the 
FTCA, unless it is wholly evident that the other remedy was intended 
by Congress to be the exclusive remedy.109  For example, the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act provides an exclusive remedy for a claim 
against the United States for the recovery of expenses incurred in the 
course of cleaning up an oil spill that allegedly resulted from the 
negligence of the United States.110  However, the non-cleanup cost 
claims, which are based on the negligence of government employees 
involved in oil spills, are cognizable under the FTCA.111  In litigation 
related to a chemical release, as with any litigation to recover 
damages, multiple claims are necessary to ensure complete recovery 
based on the various available statutes and remedies.  The FTCA 
exclusive remedies provision requires a similar approach, that is, 
ensuring that claims for recovery are based both on the FTCA and on 
remedies not available under the FTCA. 
3.  Independent Contractor as Government Actor 
The FTCA specifically excludes from the term “federal agency” 
any contractor with the United States,112 and “courts have consistently 
held that the United States is not liable for the torts of its independent 
contractors.”113  However, the government is liable for its own 
negligence in the same manner that an employer of an independent 
contractor is held liable for the employer’s own negligence under the 
applicable local law.114  And, when the government contracts for the 
performance of hazardous work, it owes a nondelegable duty to third 
parties to ensure that adequate safety precautions have been taken.115  
Under federal statute regarding a contract for handling hazardous 
wastes from defense facilities, a contractor “will reimburse the 
[f]ederal [g]overnment for all liabilities incurred by, penalties 
 
109 2-11 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 11.05. 
110 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i) (2006), cited in Platte Pipe Line Co. v. 
United States, 846 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1988). 
111 Id. 
112 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006). 
113 1-8 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 8.03[7] (referencing many federal 
courts of appeals cases). 
114 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006); Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9, 11 (5th 
Cir. 1968). 
115 McCall v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy ex rel. Bonneville Power Admin., 914 F.2d 191, 
195 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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assessed against, costs incurred by, and damages suffered by the 
[g]overnment that are caused by” a contractor’s “breach of any term 
or provision of the contract” and “any negligent or willful act or 
omission of the contractor.”116  The majority of courts have enforced 
indemnification and hold harmless agreements between potentially 
responsible parties (PRP), allowing them to allocate environmental 
liability among themselves as they see fit; however, rules governing 
indemnification agreements within government contracts are quite 
restrictive.117  Executive Order 10,789 provides that when a 
government contractor has acquired advance approval from the 
Secretary of the Army for risks that the contract defines as unusually 
hazardous, the contractor shall be held harmless and indemnified 
against claims or losses not compensated by insurance.118  Executive 
Order 10,789 also authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the 
secretaries of the branches of the armed services to enter into 
contracts without regard to provisions of law if such contracts will 
facilitate the national defense.119  “‘[N]ational defense’ means 
programs for military and energy production or construction, military 
. . . assistance to any foreign nation, . . . stockpiling, space, and any 
directly related activity.”120  The term “includes emergency 
preparedness activities conducted pursuant to title VI of [the Stafford 
Act].”121  Emergency preparedness covers activities to “minimize the 
effects of a hazard” and to effectuate emergency repair or restoration 
of “vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by the 
hazard.”122  However, Executive Order 10,789 does not protect a 
 
116 10 U.S.C. § 2708(a)(1) (2006) (applying to both contractors and subcontractors). 
117 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (Nov. 14, 1958), reprinted as 
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006); see generally Warren G. Foote, The Chemical 
Demilitarization Program—Will It Destroy the Nation’s Stockpile of Chemical Weapons 
by December 31, 2004?, 146 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994).  Foote’s article provides excellent 
background on the development of the demilitarization framework and process. 
118 Exec. Order No. 10,789, supra note 117, at Part I(1A)(a).  Under Part I(1) of this 
executive order and the National Defense Contractors Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006), the 
President may authorize the Department of Defense to modify a contract, which includes 
providing for indemnification, whenever such action would facilitate the national defense. 
119 Exec. Order No. 10,789, supra note 117, at Part I(2). 
120 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(14) (2006). 
121 Id. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 5195a (2006). 
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contractor from losses or claims by the United States caused by the 
contractor’s willful misconduct or lack of good faith.123 
In applying Executive Order 10,789 to recovery from a chemical 
release, a local government, business, or individual may be able to 
obtain relief from a government contractor depending on the conduct 
of the contractor and on the agreement between the contractor and the 
government.  Once the source of the release is traced to the action or 
inaction of a government contractor, the potential claimant would 
need to obtain and review the contract between the contractor and the 
government.  The potential claimant should carefully examine any 
provisions regarding the contractor’s liability, as well as any 
information related to the contractor’s willful conduct or lack of good 
faith. 
4.  Feres Doctrine 
Another important doctrine barring FTCA claims is the Feres 
doctrine.  This common law doctrine says that the United States 
cannot be held liable for injuries sustained by military personnel 
incident to service, regardless of whether recovery is sought directly 
in an action by the injured individuals or their heirs or indirectly in a 
third party claim.124  The Feres doctrine can bar suit even in cases 
involving torts committed by civilian employees of the federal 
government.125  The Ninth Circuit analyzes on a case-by-case basis 
whether the Feres doctrine bars an action.126  For example, the Feres 
doctrine barred an action brought by an active duty service member 
who sustained injuries while participating in a recreational activity on 
the base because she was on authorized liberty and not engaged in 
 
123 Exec. Order No. 10,789, supra note 117, at Part I(1A)(b)(2).  One author uses 
Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility as an example to demonstrate the basic relationship 
between the government and the private contractor in munitions incinerator operations. 
Foote, supra note 117, at 48–56. 
124 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
125 United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). 
126 The court related the following: 
In Johnson this court looked to the following four factors to determine whether an 
activity is incident to military service: 
(1) the place where the negligent act occurred, (2) the duty status of the plaintiff 
when the negligent act occurred, (3) the benefits accruing to the plaintiff because of 
his status as a service member, and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities at the 
time the negligent act occurred. 
Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Johnson v. United 
States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1436–41 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
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official duties.127  However, in another example, the Feres doctrine 
did not bar an action to recover from injuries resulting from 
“independent post-service negligence” when the government failed to 
warn a veteran exposed to radiation or to monitor his condition, even 
though the government learned of the danger after the serviceman left 
the service.128  If there is a state law duty to warn, said the Ninth 
Circuit, there would be an FTCA action based on that state law 
duty.129  The Feres doctrine could be applied to military personnel 
and civilian agency employees working in the area of a chemical 
release.  Given the effectiveness of the Feres doctrine in barring 
recovery, individuals working at a federal facility would need to 
consider the alternatives to bringing a claim in order to recover from a 
chemical incident.  Proactive measures such as reviewing insurance 
plans and taking protective action assume a more significant role in 
possible Feres doctrine cases. 
E.  The Federal Tort Claims Act and Tort Actions in State Law 
The FTCA requires that an action constitute a tort under the 
applicable state law.130  Using a federal facility at UMAD in Oregon 
as an example, the following paragraphs discuss torts, beginning with 
negligence, that would likely form the basis of a suit in the case of a 
chemical release at a federal facility.  Even as a stand alone source of 
remedies, state laws, though they vary among the states, provide 
important potential avenues for recovery, especially where attempts to 
coordinate recovery under federal law do not succeed.  State law 
remedies are generally available against private actors, such as 
government contractors whose contracts do not immunize them from 
liability.  And in some cases, such as those where liability is 
associated with ultrahazardous activities, like the incineration of 
chemical weapons in the case of UMAD, state law remedies may 
provide more effective recovery.  State statutes and common law 
vary, however, and it is essential to review the elements of a given 
state law to see what claims are available and what limits apply.  
 
127 Id. at 1093. 
128 Broudy v. United States, 722 F.2d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting a widow to 
bring suit under the FTCA for failure of the government to warn or monitor her husband, a 
former serviceman, for cancer related to his exposure to radiation while ordered to work in 
proximity to nuclear tests in Nevada), aff’d sub nom. In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric 
Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987). 
129 Id. 
130 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
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Further, where a release comes from a federal facility, either the 
FTCA or its cousin, the MCA, will be the principal potential means of 
recovery, and, therefore, it will be necessary to orchestrate bringing 
claims under both state and federal law. 
1.  Negligence 
To bring a suit alleging negligence in Oregon the complaint must 
demonstrate: 
(1) that defendant’s conduct caused a foreseeable risk of harm, (2) 
that the risk is to an interest of a kind that the law protects against 
negligent invasion, (3) that defendant’s conduct was unreasonable 
in light of the risk, (4) that the conduct was the cause of plaintiff’s 
harm, and (5) that plaintiff was within the class of persons and 
plaintiff’s injury was within the general type of potential incidents 
and injuries that made defendant’s conduct negligent.131 
A significant challenge in negligence cases involves the fourth 
element, causation.  To meet the causation requirement the plaintiff 
must show that “but for” defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not 
have been injured.132  In establishing causation, the lawyer must 
establish that the injury is the result of defendant’s action; however, 
the lawyer does not have to identify the specific threshold levels of 
exposure necessary to cause the harm or injury at issue.133  For 
example, in a case involving the New Carissa, concerning recovery of 
damages for shellfish beds tainted by oil pollution following the 
grounding of the oil tanker off Coos Bay, the defense argued that 
there were no studies establishing the threshold levels of oil necessary 
to cause harm to shellfish.134  However, the court ultimately held that 
a showing of causation could be made without the identification of 
the threshold levels.135 
 
131 Graham v. Multnomah County, 972 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
Solberg v. Johnson, 760 P.2d 867, 870 (Or. 1980)) (emphasis omitted). 
132 Joshi v. Providence Health Sys., 149 P.3d 1164, 1168–69 (Or. 2006).  See also 
Richard G. Rumrell, Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove an Environmental Case 
Against the Federal Government Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 
389 (1990). 
133 Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). 
134 Id. at 1061 (finding that plaintiff’s expert ruling out low salinity as a cause of oyster 
mortality, and therefore concluding that oil exposure caused demise of oysters where there 
was oil found in every specimen, was sufficiently reliable as required by Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993)). 
135 Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1061. 
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In the case of personal injury, Redlands Soccer Club Inc. v. 
Department of the Army136 provides perhaps the most commonly cited 
example of tracing causation.  In Redlands Soccer, plaintiffs sought 
damages to pay for monitoring medical conditions, alleging that 
Army operations had previously contaminated a soccer field, an area 
where the public was now known to frequent and use.137  In Oregon, 
however, conduct that results only in a significantly increased risk of 
injury that requires medical monitoring does not give rise to a claim 
for negligence.138 
Briefly stated, these cases demonstrate the importance of 
determining what level of proof would be required to establish 
causation if it were necessary to bring suit to recover on the theory 
that a party’s negligence was responsible for a chemical release and 
the subsequent harm.  Promptly investing in expert, perhaps forensic, 
data collection on the terrain is highly advisable if there is a chemical 
release and subsequent concern for personal injury from exposure.139  
When the scope of the impact of a chemical release is smaller, it may 
be easier to collect the necessary data.  However, when the scope is 
broader and it is necessary to determine the impact on locations 
hundreds of miles away from the place of the incident, the data is at 
least as important and maybe that much more difficult to obtain.  
Adequate monitoring, especially of airborne substances or 
contaminated water, is the key to obtaining this necessary data. 
2.  Negligent Failure to Warn 
Oregon common law has found a failure to warn as grounds for a 
possible action in negligence.140  In order to prove this claim, the 
plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant could reasonably foresee there 
 
136 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995). 
137 Id. at 851 (denying summary judgment and permitting plaintiffs to proceed on the 
issue of whether present injuries, including need for special medical monitoring, have been 
caused by their exposure to any toxic substances the Army may have deposited in the 
landfill under the park in which they played). 
138 See Lowe v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181 (Or. 2008) (upholding the 
Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision that a cigarette smoker was not entitled to a negligence 
finding when there was no evidence presented of present physical harm and the plaintiff 
alleged that the harm created the need for medical monitoring). 
139 See Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic 
Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 285 
(1994), for a more comprehensive discussion of proving damages caused by exposure to 
chemicals. 
140 Fuhrer v. Gearhart-By-The-Sea, Inc., 760 P.2d 874, 877 (Or. 1988). 
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was an unreasonable risk of harm, (2) the defendant knew or should 
have known of the dangerous condition, (3) the defendant had a duty 
to warn or protect, (4) the defendant did not warn of the risk, and (5) 
the plaintiff is injured as a result of the failure to warn.141  In the 
example of a release at UMAD, the CSEPP mission is to assist state 
and local governments in carrying out functions relating to off-post 
emergency preparedness and response.  Fulfilling the CSEPP mission 
includes setting up and supporting a warning system and creating a 
legal relationship that requires the Department of Homeland Security 
and FEMA to warn of off-post chemical releases, with the 
Department of the Army responsible for on-post activities.142  A 
failure of the warning system provides sufficient grounds for bringing 
a negligence claim against whichever party caused the warning 
system to malfunction. 
3.  Toxic Torts 
A “toxic tort” is “a tort claim that results from the exposure of the 
plaintiff to toxic (chemical or radioactive) substances because of the 
defendant’s actions.”143  Toxic tort actions are often brought as claims 
of negligence,144 but may also include other claims such as strict 
liability or abnormally dangerous substances.  However, claims other 
than negligence are beyond the FTCA.145  Oregon does not have a 
toxic tort per se; rather, efforts to recover from toxic torts are based 
on claims of negligence, strict liability, and abnormally dangerous 
substances.  Oregon law defines toxic substances as “any substance, 
other than radioactive substance, that has the capacity to produce 
personal injury or illness to humans through ingestion, inhalation, or 
absorption through any body surface.”146  The Consumer Product 
Safety Commission uses the same definition,147 and the Federal Toxic 
Substances Control Act defines a toxic substance as one whose 
“manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal 
of the chemical substance with respect to which such application was 
 
141 Id. at 878. 
142 50 U.S.C.A. § 1521(c)(4) (West 2009). 
143 Wells, supra note 139, at 287. 
144 Id. 
145 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006); 2-11 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 11.07 
(quoting Martinez v. Fenn, 702 F. Supp. 126, 127 (D.S.C. 1988)). 
146 OR. REV. STAT. § 453.005(18) (2009). 
147 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(5) (2009). 
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made, or that any combination of such activities, presents or will 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.”148  The C.F.R. designates a list of specific elements and 
compounds that qualify as toxic.149  For an acute exposure toxic tort 
case, such as the catastrophe that occurred at the Union Carbide plant 
in Bhopal, India, the factual issues are similar to those of a bus or 
airplane incident.150  A single chemical release could also initiate a 
series of releases, which would be classified as a continuing tort.151 
4.  Nuisance and Trespass 
Nuisance and trespass actions may also be brought to recover 
damages for the deposit of substances on a person’s land.  A trespass 
action may be brought where there is an invasion of a possessor’s 
interest in the exclusive possession of land, and a nuisance action may 
be brought where there is an invasion of a landowner’s use and 
enjoyment of the landowner’s land.152  Defendants might be liable for 
intentional trespass or nuisance if they knew, or should have known, 
that their actions would result in chemical substances entering a 
person’s property.153  Examples of cases in Oregon that were found to 
be trespass and nuisance include, but are not limited to, actions based 
on noise, vibration, odors, smoke, dust, mist from irrigation, use of 
pesticides, and use of crop production substances.154  For example, in 
Lunda v. Matthews, a cement plant was found liable for damages and 
was enjoined from operations where its operation unreasonably 
 
148 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f)(3)(B) (2006). 
149 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 (2009). 
150 Wells, supra note 139, at 288. 
151 See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 50-6, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS AND MATERIAL: CHEMICAL ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT RESPONSE AND 
ASSISTANCE (CAIRA) OPERATIONS (2003) [hereinafter AP 50-6], available at 
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/p50_6.pdf. 
152 Carvalho v. Wolfe, 140 P.3d 1161, 1162 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Martin v. 
Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 792 (Or. 1959)). 
153 Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). 
154 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2009); see also McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 421 
P.2d 957, 961 (Or. 1966) (finding punitive damages consideration was appropriate where a 
mill did not do everything reasonably possible to prevent trespass of effluents emitted 
from a mill stack); Martin, 342 P.2d at 790 (finding that operation of a plant causing gases 
and particulates to become airborne and settle upon plaintiff’s land, rendering it unfit for 
raising livestock, created an action for trespass even where particles were invisible). 
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interfered with nearby homeowners’ use of their properties.155  
Oregon law provides for damages and abatement, or even an 
injunction, when defendants are liable for nuisance.156  Applying this 
to chemical release, it would be necessary to examine state law to see 
whether nuisance and trespass actions are recognized in a given state 
for the intrusion of invisible substances.  It would be possible to do 
this in advance as a part of an exercise.  In addition, exercises 
simulating releases on federal facilities could include tracing the 
footprint of the impact of chemical releases to determine the scope of 
the release. 
5.  Abnormally Dangerous Activity 
Koos v. Roth provides the Oregon criteria for deciding whether an 
activity qualifies as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous.  In 
Oregon, the factors considered in determining ultrahazardous or 
abnormally dangerous activity, which were set forth in Koos are: 
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm 
to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) Whether the gravity of 
the harm which may result from it is likely to be great; (c) Whether 
the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) 
Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) Whether 
the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on; and 
(f) The value of the activity to the community.157 
Aerial chemical spraying and ground-based spraying have both been 
found to be abnormally dangerous activities.158  Under the theory of 
abnormally dangerous activities, the plaintiff may recover damages 
for injury to property and for personal injury, including emotional 
distress.  In addition, the court may award special and punitive 
 
155 613 P.2d at 67 (affirming the injunction and liability of cement plant operators for 
trespass and nuisance where dust, debris, fumes, and operational noise interfered with 
nearby homeowners’ use and possession of their land). 
156 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.505 (2009). 
157 652 P.2d 1255, 1260 n.3 (Or. 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
520 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964)).  Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
(a) An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict 
liability for physical harm resulting from the activity.  (b) An activity is abnormally 
dangerous if: (1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of 
physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and (2) the 
activity is not one of common usage. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 (2005). 
158 Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 318 (Or. 1961); Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v. 
Duyck, 759 P.2d 1133, 1134–35 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
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damages against private defendants.159  Conforming with safety 
regulations is not a defense to a strict liability claim for 
ultrahazardous activities because those safety regulations address the 
duty of care owed by the defendant to others, and strict liability is not 
based on lack of care or fault.160  If, however, a state has specifically 
authorized the abnormally dangerous activity through legislative 
approval, which implies a grant of immunity, the defendant cannot be 
held strictly liable for resulting damage.161  Statutes pertaining to 
federal facilities, such as the UMAD and its operations of incinerating 
chemical weapons, should be examined for such statements of 
immunity.  However, absent special circumstances indicating an 
intent to confer immunity from strict liability, the normal 
interpretation of a legislative act is to authorize the plaintiff to 
proceed and to hold the defendant strictly responsible if the activity 
results in harm to those in the vicinity.162 
F.  Statute of Limitations Defenses to Torts 
Two statutes of limitations come into play in a tort action brought 
under the FTCA.  Although state law provides the substantive basis 
for suit,163 the FTCA has its own statute of limitations.  The claimant 
 
159 See McGregor v. Barton Sand & Gravel, Inc., 660 P.2d 175, 180–81 (Or. Ct. App. 
1983) (finding plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages where defendants left a 
problem uncorrected for four years, resulting in serious property damage and the danger of 
ongoing and new problems, including landslides if the conditions were not remedied). 
160 McLane v. Nw. Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d 635, 640–41 (Or. 1970). 
161 See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 175, 208–12 (2007) (stating that statutory immunity for strict liability, such as 
is found in the Stafford Act and the FTCA, is based on discretionary function and 
discussing a stronger state act, New York’s State Defense Emergency Act, which extends 
more immunity to work done in emergency situations, but does not extend immunity to the 
point of eliminating strict liability, in part because the emergency does not relieve the duty 
of reasonable care). 
162 McLane, 467 P.2d at 641.  The Oregon State Bar provides publications with 
additional discussions on toxic torts in Oregon.  See Gregory E. Skillman & Danna C. 
Fogarty, Toxic Torts, in TORTS, 22-1 to -23 (Oregon State Bar Continuing Legal 
Education ed., 2006 & Supp. 2006). 
163 State law statutes of limitations would apply to private actions.  For example, in the 
case of a release from UMAD, actions claiming negligence and other torts causing 
personal injury must be filed within two years of the date of the injury under Oregon law.  
OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(1) (2009).  For a continuing tort action brought to recover for 
poisoning by chemicals emanating from an aluminum reduction plant, the claim was not 
barred where the action was filed within two years after the plaintiffs’ last exposure to the 
chemicals.  Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 332–33 (9th Cir. 1958).  In 
Oregon, no action for negligence may be brought more than ten years after the date of the  
 2009] When Chemical Releases Occur at a Federal Facility 395 
has two years to file an administrative claim.164  Once the agency 
disposes of the claim, the claimant has six months to sue.165  It is 
possible that the statute of limitations for CERCLA could prevent 
bringing an FTCA suit if one waits until after the CERCLA 
remediation process has begun to bring an action.  Therefore, it is 
better to begin the process of exhausting remedies by filing a claim 
and beginning the Army claims process to meet the FTCA statute of 
limitations.166  If CERCLA does apply, delayed discovery of an injury 
may toll the statute of limitations.167  The CERCLA statute of 
limitations preempts state statutes of limitations if the state limitations 
period provides for an earlier commencement date than federal law.168  
The statute provides that: 
(a)(1) In the case of any action brought under [s]tate law for 
personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or 
contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant 
or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the 
applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the 
[s]tate statute of limitations or under common law) provides a 
commencement date which is earlier than the federally required 
commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally 
required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such 
State statute. 
 . . . . 
(b)(4)(A) [T]he term “federally required commencement date” 
means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have 
known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in 
subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by 
the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.169 
The discovery rule commonly applied to federal courts is that the 
plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of a claim “when the 
 
act or omission.  OR. REV. STAT. § 12.115(1) (2009).  The Oregon statute of limitations 
for trespass or nuisance actions is six years from the date of the injury.  Id. § 12.080(3). 
164 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006). 
165 Id. § 2675.  In Oregon, the statute of limitations runs when a person knows or 
reasonably should know these three elements exist: harm, causation, and tortious conduct.  
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 980 P.2d 141, 146 (Or. 1999), answer to certified 
question conformed to by 189 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1999). 
166 For further discussion of the intersection of CERCLA and the FTCA, see infra notes 
262–72 and accompanying text. 
167 O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002). 
168 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006). 
169 Id. § 9658(a)(1), (b)(4)(A). 
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plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of his injury.”170  
Even if a CERCLA claim is not brought, the later statute of 
limitations might apply since the purpose of § 9658 was to deal with 
the inadequacies of many state tort systems regarding the delayed 
discovery of the effect of a release of a toxic substance.171  The 
legislative history of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 confirms this result, indicating that after receiving 
recommendations concerning the inadequacy of state laws, Congress 
fully intended § 9658 to alter the statute of limitations rules applicable 
to state law claims, regardless of whether plaintiffs also asserted 
CERCLA claims.172  The Ninth Circuit referred to this legislative 
history and used additional analysis to find that § 9658 preempted the 
Oregon state statute of repose for negligence.173 
G.  The Military Claims Act 
The MCA offers another means to recover from the federal 
government in the event of a chemical release.174  The MCA covers 
claims including property damage, personal injury, or death caused by 
either a civilian officer or an employee of the Army, Navy, or Air 
Force acting within the scope of her employment or caused otherwise 
incident to noncombat activities of that department.175  Claims 
covered under the FTCA are not cognizable under the MCA.176  In the 
event that representatives of the military department deny that 
negligence alleged in an FTCA claim occurred, the claim would in 
many instances be eligible for processing under the MCA.177  
Claimants who may obtain relief under the MCA include all persons 
who suffer personal injury or death, except military or civilian 
personnel when the injury or death occurs incident to their service.178  
 
170 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979). 
171 See id. at 119 n.6. 
172 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-962, at 222–23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276 (discussing need for liberalization of state statutes of limitations); H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-253(I), at 285 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2960 (viewing 
provision as “[s]tate procedural reform” and contemplating that federal rule would apply 
even in actions brought in state court). 
173 McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 2008). 
174 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 536.73–.82 (2009). 
175 Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2006). 
176 32 C.F.R. § 536.74(b). 
177 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b)(2); 1-1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 79, § 1.04. 
178 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b). 
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These personal injury claims may allege damages resulting from pain 
and suffering, loss of time, earnings, or services, diminished earning 
capacity, permanent injury, anticipated medical expenses, death 
benefits, or other theories of damages available in a suit at law.179  A 
claim arising from “noncombat activities” is one that arises from 
“[a]uthorized activities essentially military in nature, having little 
parallel in civilian pursuits, which historically have been considered 
as furnishing a proper basis for payment of claims.”180  Examples of 
noncombat activities include: “practice firing of missiles and 
weapons; training and field exercises, and military maneuvers, 
including the operation of aircraft and vehicles; use and occupancy of 
real estate; [and] movement of combat and other vehicles designed for 
military use.”181  A claim under the MCA must be brought within two 
years after the claim accrues.182 
The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or 
Coast Guard have the authority to pay settlements up to $100,000 per 
claim where a person has been injured or killed or his property has 
been damaged and the MCA authorizes payment of the claims.183  If 
the Secretary determines a claim exceeding $100,000 is meritorious, 
the Secretary may pay $100,000 and report the amount in excess of 
$100,000 to the Treasury for payment under a different statute.184  In 
addition to the MCA’s capped settlement awards, remedies are further 
limited because the statute precludes judicial review.185  Claims under 
the MCA must be settled to result in recovery; unlike the FTCA, the 
MCA provides only an administrative process and does not permit 
 
179 32 C.F.R. § 536.77. 
180 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. NO. 27-20, LEGAL SERVICES: CLAIMS 108 (2008) 
[hereinafter AR 27-20], available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27_20.pdf. 
181 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-162, LEGAL SERVICES: CLAIMS 
PROCEDURES 114 (2008) [hereinafter AP 27-162], available at http://www.army.mil/ 
usapa/epubs/pdf/p27_162.pdf. 
182 10 U.S.C. § 2733(b)(1).  Exceptions exist for wartime, when the statute of 
limitations is tolled, and in a case of partial negligence, when the claim would succeed or 
be barred depending on the law of the state where the release occurred.  Id.  The date a 
claim accrues is the date on which the claimant is aware of the injury and its cause.  32 
C.F.R. § 536.47 (2009). 
183 10 U.S.C. § 2736(a) (2006). 
184 Id. § 2733(d); 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (authorizing additional payment). 
185 Hata v. United States, 23 F.3d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1994).  Judicial review is available 
only as to constitutional violations and as to violations of clear statutory mandate.  Id. at 
233. 
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appeals to federal court to review the factual agency 
determinations.186 
H.  Administrative Remedies: The Army Claims Process 
Administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing an action 
under the FTCA.187  Each department of the armed services has 
regulations outlining procedures for filing an administrative claim.  
For the purpose of illustration in this article, the Army regulations 
will be used, though the military departments and administrative 
agencies vary.  Regulations applying to Army claims are intended to 
ensure that claims are investigated properly, claims are adjudicated 
according to applicable law, and valid recoveries and affirmative 
claims are pursued against carriers, third-party insurers, and 
tortfeasors.188 
Army Regulation (AR) 27-20 sets forth the policies and legal 
principles for investigating, processing, and settling claims against, 
and in favor of the United States.189  Intended to be used as a guiding 
policy for the detailed procedures in the Department of the Army 
Pamphlet 27-162, the regulations apply to the Active Army and 
Department of Defense civilian employees, among others.190  In the 
example of a chemical release, the Army would follow a plan known 
as the Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance 
(CAIRA) plan.  Disaster claims plans are already drafted to deal with 
chemical accidents or incidents and should be followed.191  Chemical 
accident or incident plans include provisions for immediate response 
and such plans set up a special claims office to process claims on 
location.192  The special claims processing office should be staffed 
with a claims judge advocate with delegated authority to pay claims 
of $25,000 or less for MCA claims and $50,000 or less for FTCA 
claims.193  The special claims processing office should have adequate 
investigatory, administrative, and logistical support, which should 
 
186 10 U.S.C. § 2735 (2006); Hata, 23 F.3d at 232–33. 
187 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006). 
188 32 C.F.R. § 536.1 (2009). 
189 AR 27-20, supra note 180, at i. 
190 Id. at 1. 
191 AP 50-6, supra note 151, at 53–54. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 55. 
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include support in the areas of damage assessment, finance, and 
accounting.194 
1.  Claims 
The Army claim is the same claim that would be used for an FTCA 
action should the administrative claim be denied, therefore care must 
be taken to present the claim properly and fully.  In the Army claims 
process, a claim is a writing that contains a sum certain for each 
claimant and that is signed by each claimant or by an authorized 
representative.195  The writing must contain enough information to 
permit investigation.196  Normally a claim will be presented on a 
Standard Form (SF) 95, and when it is not, the claimant will be asked 
to fill out an SF 95 to facilitate processing the investigation and the 
claim.197  The claimant cannot later demand more money than the 
initial administrative claim, unless the additional sum is justified by 
evidence discovered after the administrative claim was filed;198 
consequently, the certainty of the sum requested must be carefully 
reviewed before submitting the claim.  To be payable, a claim must be 
filed no later than two years from the date the claim accrues, as 
determined by federal law.199  The accrual date is the date on which 
 
194 Id. 
195 32 C.F.R. § 536.26 (2009). 
196 Id. 
197 See generally GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., STANDARD FORM NO. 95, CLAIM FOR 
DAMAGE, INJURY, OR DEATH (2007), available at http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/ 
formslibrary.do?formType=SF (follow “Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death” hyperlink; 
then follow “SF95_e.pdf” hyperlink).  Claims personnel are to render assistance at the 
initial contact to discuss all aspects of the claims, determine which statutes or procedures 
apply, and advise claimants of the remedies.  AR 27-20, supra note 180, at 13.  When a 
claims office receives a claim that clearly fails to state a sum certain, a claims attorney 
should immediately notify the claimant or the claimant’s counsel, by telephone if 
necessary, that the purported claim fails to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the 
FTCA.  Bodensteiner, Tort Claims Note: Requirement for a Sum Certain, ARMY LAW., 
July 1992, at 41.  Small claims procedures may be used “whenever a claim may be settled 
for $5,000 or less.”  32 C.F.R. § 536.33 (2009).  Such “procedures are designed to save 
processing time and eliminate the need for most of the documentation otherwise required.”  
Id.  The process requires only completion of the form DA 1668.  AP 27-162, supra note 
181, at 19; see generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DA FORM NO. 1668, SMALL CLAIMS 
CERTIFICATE, available at http://www.usa-federal-forms.com/usa-fedforms-dod-da/dod    
-da-1668-nonfillable.pdf. 
198 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (2006). 
199 32 C.F.R. § 536.47. 
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the claimant is aware of the injury and its cause.200  A properly filed 
claim stops the running of the statute of limitations on the date it is 
received by the appropriate federal agency.201  The claimant is not 
required to know the negligent or wrongful nature of the act or 
omission giving rise to the claim.202 
While timely filling out and filing a written claim is key to 
obtaining any administrative remedy or damages under the FTCA, 
adequately accounting for the needed sum is an important limiting 
factor in recovery.  Army personnel are supposed to assist in filing 
claims; however, for high value cases, assessing the sum certain, 
along with establishing causation, may require the most preparation. 
2.  Constitutional Tort and Real Estate Claims 
Some potential FTCA claims may be covered as Fifth Amendment 
takings, payable as real estate claims.  The Tucker Act203 provides 
original jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over causes of 
action alleging property loss caused by a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment, where the intrusion on the land is a continuous invasion 
by noise, gas, smoke, or water emanating from a government 
property.204  Federal regulations also permit takings claims to be paid 
in an altered form as real estate claims.205  Depending on the facts, a 
real estate claim may be payable as a trespass claim under AR 27-
20.206 
Inverse condemnation refers to a claim against a governmental 
agency to recover the value of property taken by the agency when no 
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain was completed by 
 
200 Id.  For purposes of the FTCA, a tort claim accrues when a “plaintiff has discovered 
both his injury and its cause.”  United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979).  Yet, 
the Ninth Circuit rejects mandatory inclusion of the discovery regarding who inflicted the 
injury.  Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1984). 
201 32 C.F.R. § 536.26; .47. 
202 32 C.F.R. § 536.47. 
203 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
204 AP 27-162, supra note 181, at 27. 
205 32 C.F.R. § 536.42; AP 27-162, supra note 181, at 62. 
206 AP 27-162, supra note 181, at 27.  Such claims usually arise during a training 
exercise or an emergency deployment.  Id.  If the real property is occupied for thirty days 
or less, the claim will be generally for trespass; if occupation is for thirty-one or more 
days, it will generally produce a real estate claim.  Id.  Claims for consequential property 
damage by civilian employees may only be considered in the Court of Federal Claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491.  Id. at 14. 
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the agency.207  In such cases, claims may be brought under the takings 
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and similar 
provisions of state constitutions.208  Federal case law does support a 
finding of inverse condemnation from military related activities.209  
Those impacted by a chemical release from a federal facility would 
have to evaluate possible federal and state inverse condemnation 
claims and determine whether an administrative claim would be more 
likely to succeed and more financially viable given the required levels 
of proof. 
3.  Environmental Claims 
Claims for property damage, personal injury, or death arising in the 
United States and based on contamination by toxic substances found 
in the air or ground must be reported by the U.S. Army Claims 
Service (USARCS) to the Environmental Law Division of the Army 
Litigation Center, and the Environmental Torts Branch of the U.S. 
Department of Justice.210  The Department of the Army recognizes 
two types of environmental claims.211  “The first type asserts damage 
or injury resulting directly from the contamination; these claims are 
processed under [Army Regulation (AR) 27-20].”212  According to 
Army regulations, most environmental claims do not involve claims 
under AR 27-20.213  The second and more common type of claim 
 
207 Lincoln Loan Co. v. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n, 545 P.2d 105, 106 n.1 
(Or. 1976) (citing Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 101 n.1 (Or. 1962)). 
208 Section 18 of Oregon’s Constitution serves as an example: 
Private property or services taken for public use; just compensation.  Private 
property shall not be taken for public use, nor the particular services of any man be 
demanded, without just compensation; nor except in the case of the state, without 
such compensation first assessed and tendered; provided, that the use of all roads, 
ways and waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw products of 
mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or drainage is necessary to the 
development and welfare of the state and is declared a public use. 
OR. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
209 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946); Branning v. United States, 654 
F.2d 88, 102 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 106.  These cases deal with facts 
based on overflight noise from planes and applying case law outside this context may be 
difficult.  For another application of inverse condemnation to military activity, see Richard 
M. Lattimer, Jr., Myopic Federalism: The Public Trust Doctrine and Regulation of 
Military Activities, 150 MIL. L. REV. 79, 147 (1995). 
210 32 C.F.R. § 536.35 (2009). 
211 AP 27-162, supra note 181, at 27. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
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“seeks to recover the costs of or, damages attributable to, the 
necessary ‘cleanup’ response; these claims are processed under the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA).”214  The line 
between the two types is “difficult to draw, requiring close 
coordination between claims and environmental personnel.”215  The 
Administrative Claims Officer (ACO) must review toxic tort claims 
to “determine whether to refer them to environmental personnel for 
processing under DERA.”216  When the ACO is “presented with a 
claim alleging damage or injury resulting from the release of a 
hazardous substance into the common environment, the ACO . . . 
must determine whether CERCLA procedures may abate the release 
or ameliorate both its short-term and long-term effects.”217  However,  
[i]f the installation elects to abate a release of contamination or 
ameliorate its effects, whether as the result of a claim or not, its 
legal staff must inform the command and the civilian community 
that the Army is acting under the mandate of the Installation 
Restoration Program and not because of potential tort liability.218 
III 
CERCLA 
An incident releasing a reportable quantity of a chemical that 
would constitute a hazardous substance may trigger the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),219 as amended by the Superfund 
 
214 Id.  EPA regulations require the claimant to first pursue reimbursement from the 
responsible party, so if the release occurred on a military installation, the claimant should 
first make a demand on the Army.  40 C.F.R. § 307.30 (2009).  The Department of 
Defense “has responsibility to take all action necessary with respect to releases where . . . 
the sole source of the release is from[] any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, 
custody, or control of DOD.”  Id. § 300.175(b)(4). 
215 AP 27-162, supra note 181, at 27. 
216 Id. at 27–28. 
217 Id. at 28. 
218 Id. 
219 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).  CERCLA defines “hazardous substance” by 
referring to other federal statutes:  the definition includes hazardous waste regulated by the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act, any toxic pollutant listed under the Clean Water Act, hazardous 
air pollutants listed under the Clean Air Act, any hazardous chemical substance or mixture 
identified under the Toxic Substances Control Act, and any substance designated under 42 
U.S.C. § 9602.  Id. § 9601(14). 
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Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986.220  CERCLA 
generally applies to a release of a hazardous substance into the 
environment from a facility.221  A “release” means “any spilling, 
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, 
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing” of any hazardous 
substances into the environment, “including the abandonment or 
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles 
containing any hazardous substance.”222  In Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., the court noted that “passive migration of 
hazardous substances into the environment from where hazardous 
substances have come to be located is a release under CERCLA.”223  
The court found that there were several events that could be 
potentially characterized as releases: 
First, there is the discharge of waste from the Trail Smelter into the 
Columbia River in Canada.  Second, there is the discharge or escape 
of the slag from Canada when the Columbia River enters the United 
States.  And third, there is the leaching of heavy metals and other 
hazardous substances from the slag into the environment at the 
Site.224 
For these reasons, the court held that the leaching of hazardous 
substances from the slag at the site was a CERCLA release.225  
Pakootas underscores the significance of groundwater contamination, 
which has emerged recently as a focus of natural resource damage 
lawsuits.226  U.S. Department of the Interior regulations have assigned 
 
220 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671–9675 (2006)).  Also, imminent and 
substantial endangerment provisions provide an important avenue to press for enforcement 
of environmental cleanup or other precautions under the various environmental statutes 
other than CERCLA.  See generally de Saillan, supra note 5 (covering imminent 
endangerment provisions in depth). 
221 42 U.S.C. § 9602. 
222 Id. § 9601(22). 
223 452 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 858 (2008).  In Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., the natural, passive movement and migration of hazardous 
substances in rivers was found to be a “release” for purposes of CERCLA liability in a 
natural resources damages lawsuit.  280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1113 (D. Idaho 2003), modified 
in part sub nom. United States v. Asarco, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Idaho 2005). 
224 Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1075. 
225 Id. 
226 See Victoria L. Peters, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., Colo. Dep’t of Law, 
Remarks at the Law Seminars International Conference on Natural Resource Damages: 
New Developments and Emerging Strategies (July 17, 2008).  See generally 43 C.F.R. § 
11.62(c) (2009). 
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a specific injury definition for groundwater that includes instances 
where hazardous substance concentrations exceed certain water 
quality standards or where the concentrations are sufficient to cause 
injuries to other resources.227 
CERCLA sets up a comprehensive scheme for the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites, and imposes liability for cleanup costs on the 
parties responsible for the release or potential release of hazardous 
substances into the environment.228  CERCLA imposes retroactive 
strict liability on past and present owners and operators of a facility 
where a release of a hazardous substance has occurred  as well as 
persons who generate, dispose of, or arrange for the disposal of a 
hazardous substance.229  A responsible party may seek to avoid 
liability for cleanup and recovery costs under CERCLA by 
establishing that the incident was caused solely by “(1) an act of God; 
(2) an act of war; [or] (3) an act or omission of a third party.”230  
There is little authority regarding CERCLA’s act of war provision. 
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this provision 
in United States v. Shell Oil Company, where the United States and 
the State of California commenced litigation against Shell and other 
oil companies to recover cleanup costs incurred at various waste 
dumpsites from aviation fuel refineries operated during World War 
II.231  In an attempt to avoid CERCLA liability, the companies 
asserted the act of war defense, arguing that because the aviation fuel 
had been produced during wartime, they were not responsible for the 
waste product resulting from the production of the fuel.232 
The most viable defense for a party faced with liability arising 
from a terrorist attack might be CERCLA’s third party defense.  This 
defense asserts, inter alia, that the party took due care and precautions 
against the foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party, as well as 
the foreseeable consequences of the third party’s acts or omissions.233  
 
227 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(c)(1)(i)–(iv). 
228 Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1072. 
229 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20), 9607(a) (2006). 
230 Id. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671–9675 
(2006)); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 465.257 (2009) (permitting contribution costs from a 
liable third party under Oregon law). 
231 294 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). 
232 Id. 
233 Antonio J. Rodriguez, When Your Ship is in the Bull’s Eye: The Maritime 
Transportation Security Act and Potential Vessel Owner Liability to Third Parties  
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Any person other than the federal government, states, and political 
subdivisions may assert claims for the costs of response actions.234  
Federal regulations provide the appropriate forms and procedures for 
presenting claims for necessary response costs as authorized by 
CERCLA section 112(b)(1).235 
Where CERCLA does not permit states and political subdivisions 
to bring actions, private individuals and entities may need to bring 
their own actions.  Given CERCLA’s complexity, this statute should 
be included in response planning, especially planning conducted for 
private actors because they are the most likely to be impacted by a 
chemical release.  Such planning could be part of exercises, especially 
given CERCLA’s provisions favoring settlement.236  The regulations 
provide procedures for presenting claims to the EPA for the 
following: 
[R]esponses to a release or substantial threat of release of a 
hazardous substance into the environment . . . for responses to a 
release or substantial threat of release of any pollutants or 
contaminants into the environment, which may present an imminent 
and substantial danger to public health or welfare; and . . . for 
response actions undertaken pursuant to settlement agreements in 
which the [f]ederal [g]overnment agrees to reimburse a portion of 
the cost.237 
Under CERCLA, “remedy” and “remedial action” are defined as: 
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of 
or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to 
prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they 
do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future 
public health or welfare or the environment.238 
The remedial action prevents further contamination by a chemical 
release and is important to minimizing the release’s harmful impact.  
 
Resulting from a Terrorist Attack, 17 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 241, 276 (2004–2005) (citing 33 
U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3) (2006)). 
234 40 C.F.R. § 307.20 (2009).  “Response,” as defined by CERCLA section 101(25), 
means “remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all such terms . . . including 
enforcement activities related thereto.”  Id. § 307.14.  Such claims are presented to the 
Hazardous Substance Superfund established by § 9507 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986.  26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2006). 
235 40 C.F.R. § 307.10. 
236 See infra notes 274–80 and accompanying text. 
237 40 C.F.R. § 307.11. 
238 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2006). 
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The terms also include the cost of permanent relocation of residents, 
businesses, and community facilities where the President determines 
that such relocation is more cost effective than, and environmentally 
preferable to, the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or 
disposition offsite of hazardous materials, or is otherwise necessary to 
protect public health.239 
A.  CERCLA and Federal Facilities 
CERCLA provisions apply to federal facilities.240  Additionally, the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) was created to 
carry out all response actions with respect to releases of hazardous 
substances from Department of Defense facilities.241  Any person in 
charge of the facility must notify the National Response Center of a 
release of a hazardous substance, depending on the reportable 
quantity, as soon as the person has knowledge of the release.242  A 
facility will be evaluated and ranked, and facilities that score above a 
certain level may be placed on the National Priorities List (NPL).243  
Only NPL sites are eligible for DERP financed remedial action.244  If 
a site is not listed on the NPL, DERP financed remedial action would 
not be available, though private rights of action under state law may 
provide a remedy.245 
 
239 Id.  Typical installation contamination situations include groundwater contamination 
arising from industrial operations or chemical storage and chance exposure to military 
chemical munitions.  AP 27-162, supra note 181, at 28. 
240 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (2006). 
241 10 U.S.C. § 2701(a), (c) (2006).  To fund DERP, the Department of Defense has an 
Environmental Restoration Account, funds of which may be used to carry out the 
environmental restoration functions of the Army.  Id. § 2703(a).  This account is the sole 
source of funds for all phases of an environmental remedy at a site under the Army’s 
jurisdiction.  Id. § 2703(g). 
242 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. NO. 50-6, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
AND MATERIAL: CHEMICAL SURETY 35 (2008), available at http://www.army.mil/ 
USAPA/epubs/pdf/r50_6.pdf.  Reportable quantities of hazardous substances are listed in 
Table 302.4 of 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2009). 
243 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (2009). 
244 Id. § 307.14.  It is important to distinguish between “remedial action” and 
“removal,” which have distinct definitions under CERCLA.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24) 
(2006).  Removal includes the cleanup or removal of hazardous substances from the 
environment, security fencing, temporary evacuation and housing of individuals not 
otherwise provided for, and emergency assistance provided under the Stafford Act.  Id. § 
9601(23). 
245 See de Saillan, supra note 5, at 76. 
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Under CERCLA, “[s]tate laws concerning removal and remedial 
action, including [s]tate laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to 
removal and remedial action at facilities owned or operated by a 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States.”246  This 
applies, however, only to federal facilities that “are not included on 
the National Priorities List.”247  According to one court’s 
interpretation, Congress opted to expose the United States to liability 
under state laws regarding removal and remedial action only where 
the site at issue is not included on the NPL.248  After placement on the 
NPL, CERCLA requires preparation of a remedial investigation 
feasibility study and selection by the EPA of a remedy that assures 
protection of human health and the environment.249 
Section 113(h) of CERCLA withdraws federal court jurisdiction to 
hear challenges to “removal or remedial action selected under 
[CERCLA section 104], or to review any order issued under [section 
106(a)].”250  A CERCLA removal action includes “such actions as 
may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat 
of release of hazardous substances.”251  Some courts have recognized 
that a remedial investigation feasibility study satisfies this 
definition.252  This bar applies to citizen suits and other actions.253  For 
 
246 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (2006). 
247 Id. 
248 Warminster Twp. Mun. Auth. v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (dismissing a suit brought under state law by a Pennsylvania municipality against 
the United States contending that one of its water wells was contaminated as a result of the 
release of hazardous substances from the nearby Naval Warfare Center; holding that the 
suit was barred by sovereign immunity and also by the statute of limitations since the 
continuing tort argument failed and the municipality failed to bring an appropriate 
administrative action within two years of discovery of the harm). 
249 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e).  The remedial investigation examines the existence and extent 
of the release, the source and nature of the hazardous substances involved, and the extent 
of the danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment.  Id. § 9604(b)(1).  The 
remedial investigation’s purpose “is to collect data necessary to adequately characterize 
the site for the purpose of developing and evaluating effective remedial alternatives.”  40 
C.F.R. § 300.430(d)(1) (2009).  The feasibility study is meant “to ensure that appropriate 
remedial alternatives are developed and evaluated such that relevant information 
concerning the remedial action options can be presented to a decision-maker and an 
appropriate remedy selected.”  Id. § 300.430(e)(1). 
250 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006). 
251 Id. § 9601(23). 
252 Razore v. Tulalip Tribes, 66 F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995); Boarhead Corp. v. 
Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3rd Cir. 1991) (finding that CERCLA’s section 113(h) 
precluded challenge under the National Historic Preservation Act § 106, 16 U.S.C. § 470f 
(2006)). 
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example, in McLellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 
CERCLA’s section 113(h) barred a citizen suit by individuals brought 
under other non-CERCLA statutes that challenged ongoing CERCLA 
cleanup actions.254  Section 113(h) of CERCLA identifies five 
exceptions to the withdrawal of federal jurisdiction, and a citizen suit 
concerning past actions and based on a right of action conferred in 
another statute is not one of the recognized exceptions.255 
Conclusions about the section 113(h) bar to challenges for federal 
facilities vary.  A preliminary assessment is carried out at a federal 
facility under the National Contingencies Plan, NPL, or another 
applicable remedial plan.  The section 113(h) bar applies to federal 
facilities not listed on the NPL if a cleanup has been initiated under 
section 120.256  Listing a federal facility on the NPL has significant 
consequences to local communities that are different from those that 
result from bringing actions regarding a CERCLA regulated cleanup 
of privately owned property, at least in the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has found that once a federal facility is 
placed on the NPL, challenges to federal site cleanups are not subject 
to the section 113(h) bar.257  Therefore, unlike private properties, a 
 
253 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006) (permitting any person to bring a civil action against any 
person including a state or the federal government in violation of standards, regulations, 
orders, etc., effective under CERCLA, or against the President or the EPA for failure to 
perform a nondiscretionary duty under CERCLA). 
254 47 F.3d 325, 331 (9th Cir. 1995). 
255 Id. at 330. 
256 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006).  Cf. Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 507 F.3d 522, 526 
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Section 120(e) requires the administrators of federal agencies that own 
property on this list to perform a remediation study and then to undertake any necessary 
remediation.  Cleanup efforts of federal NPL Superfund sites therefore arguably are 
initiated under [section] 120, rather than [sections] 104 or 106.”); OSI, Inc. v. United 
States, 525 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to decide whether a remedial 
action on a federal facility that was listed on the NPL would be “selected under” § 9620 
and thus not subject to § 9613(h)’s jurisdictional bar). 
257 See, e.g., Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. California EPA, 189 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 
1999) (noting that section 113(h) would not preclude challenges to a CERCLA remedial 
action, because such actions are conducted under section 120’s grant of authority); 
Pollack, 507 F.3d at 526 (“No other circuit has cited Fort Ord, but a district court 
confronting the same argument in the context of a non-NPL federal property . . . concluded 
. . . that the cleanup was authorized by [sections] 104 or 106 rather than [section] 120, and 
was therefore subject to [section] 113(h).”); Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 397 
F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1202–03 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (applying section 113(h) bar to federal 
facilities at issue regarding cleanup of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation); Heart of Am. 
Nw. v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 820 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (“This 
court implicitly followed Werlein in its In re Hanford decision by finding that section 113 
barred plaintiffs’ claims for abatement, remediation, and medical surveillance.”); Werlein  
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federal facility can be listed on the NPL, and the government can be 
in the midst remediation, and challenges may still be brought during 
the process.  An agreement that is enforceable even in the face of the 
section 113(h) bar is one of the exceptions, and the surer alternative.  
However, while the issue might evolve differently in the courts, 
presently local communities in the Ninth Circuit have precedent that 
supports raising a challenge, under section 120, to a government 
cleanup of a federal facility after a chemical release. 
The significance of the section 113(h) bar to federal court 
jurisdiction has arisen recently regarding another federal facility.  
Plaintiffs sought to use various federal environmental laws to force 
the federal government to clean up property adjacent to Dugway 
Proving Grounds near Tooele, Utah, after the property had been 
contaminated by federal military operations.258  The Tenth Circuit 
found that the action was a challenge that would “undoubtedly 
interfere with the [g]overnment’s ongoing removal efforts” and was 
therefore barred by CERCLA’s section 113(h).259 
A similar timing issue arises under CERCLA’s section 113, which 
states that, with respect to any federal facility identified under section 
120, “an action for damages . . . must be commenced within [three] 
years after the completion of the remedial action.”260  An action for 
damages may not commence “(i) prior to [sixty] days after the 
[f]ederal or [s]tate natural resource trustee provides . . . a notice of 
intent to file suit, or (ii) before selection of the remedial action if the 
President is diligently proceeding with a remedial investigation and 
feasibility study under . . . [section 120].”261  A claimant must file an 
administrative claim within two years from the date of accrual, that is, 
the date on which the claimant is aware of the injury and its cause.262  
The claimant has up to six months after the agency has mailed the 
denial to file an action in federal court under the FTCA.263  The 
 
v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 892 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 
(D. Minn. 1992); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551, 1561, 1565 
(E.D. Wash. 1991), abrogated by O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
258 Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1335 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1669 (2009). 
259 Id. at 1335–36. 
260 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1)(B). 
261 Id. 
262 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006). 
263 Id. 
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failure of the given agency to make final disposition of the claim after 
it is filed shall be deemed a final denial.264  Therefore, it may be 
difficult to determine the point in time when the action should be 
brought.  The barrier presented by the statute of limitations may 
preclude recovery for latent injuries even if the response action is 
initiated under section 120. 
One solution to the statute of limitations problem lies in presenting 
the claim as a continuing tort.  Such a claim would maintain that 
hazardous conditions continue to exist and cause injury to the 
landowner so that the landowner’s cause of action against the United 
States under the FTCA could continue to accrue for statute of 
limitations purposes until removal of toxic chemicals is 
accomplished.265  In Arcade Water District v. United States, an FTCA 
action was brought against the United States for damages incurred 
from the operation of a U.S. laundry, which was shut down prior to 
the suit but continued to contaminate a nearby well.266  The court held 
that “Arcade may elect to treat the nuisance as continuing, entitling 
Arcade to an action not for permanent damages, but rather for only 
those damages suffered in the two years preceding the filing of its 
FTCA claim.”267  The Arcade court went on to say that “[i]n 
continuing nuisance cases, ‘[r]ecovery is limited . . . to actual injury 
suffered prior to commencement of each action.’”268  Finally, the 
court stated that “should Arcade prevail, Arcade may bring successive 
actions for its periodic damages so long as the nuisance continues but 
remains impermanent.”269  The continuing tort also exists in Oregon 
common law.  For example, in Holdner v. Columbia City, the 
negligent upkeep of ditches and culverts, which caused injury or loss 
from time to time, resulted in an ongoing nuisance or trespass.270  
Continuing torts do not have a statute of limitations; rather, such torts 
remain timely not because the limitation period is tolled, but because 
the cause of action continues to accrue.271  In Holdner, an 
 
264 Id. § 2675. 
265 Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003). 
266 940 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th Cir. 1991). 
267 Id. at 1269. 
268 Id. (citing Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 869 
(1985)). 
269 Id. 
270 627 P.2d 4, 9 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
271 Id. 
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administrative complaint was timely filed with respect to those 
claims, and the district court had jurisdiction over the subsequent 
FTCA claim.272  Notice of a claim filed at any time during the 
continuance of the conduct or within 180 days after the conduct has 
ceased is timely.273  However, as with other state law claims, efficacy 
of the continuing tort legal theory depends on each state and should 
be carefully evaluated before relying on it to recover for harm 
incurred.  In Oregon, a failure to correct allegedly negligent conduct 
that results in increasing harm does not turn a discrete and separately 
actionable act into a continuing tort.274  This is especially true in the 
absence of an active, continuous relationship between the parties.275 
Another solution is to incorporate damages into a settlement 
agreement, which will then be enforceable during CERCLA 
remediation as one of the exceptions listed in section 113(h).276  Most 
site investigations and cleanups are resolved through a negotiated 
settlement that results in a consent decree or consent order governing 
the scope of work to be performed at the facility.277  CERCLA 
supports and provides incentives for settlement by excepting 
settlements from judicial review once remediation has begun.278  And, 
CERCLA protects contribution and covenants not to sue.279  States 
and political subdivisions may assert claims based on applicable 
 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Boardmaster Corp. v. Jackson County, 198 P.3d 454, 465–66 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
275 Id. 
276 The five exceptions to this withdrawal of federal jurisdiction are: (1) an action to 
recover response costs under section 107, (2) an action to enforce an order issued under 
section 106 or to recover a penalty for violation of such order, (3) an action for 
reimbursement under section 106, (4) a citizen suit action regarding a remedial action 
except removal, and (5) an action where the United States has moved to compel remedial 
action.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006). 
277 Donald A. Haagensen & Margaret B. Stern, Environmental Cleanup Liability, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 2.13 (Oregon State Bar Continuing 
Legal Education ed., 2002 & Supp. 2006).  See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (2006); David M. 
Shelton, Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services: Destroying the Incentive for Negotiated 
Settlements and Undermining the Increased Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 22 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 839, 843–47 (2007) (noting the Aviall decision limiting a PRP’s 
ability to obtain contribution from other PRPs undermines the EPA’s goal of encouraging 
the use of alternative dispute resolution to reach negotiated settlements). 
278 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622(f). 
279 Id. 
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settlement agreements.280  If there is an agreement, case law supports 
barring CERCLA’s section 113(h) exception suits.  In Heart of 
America Northwest v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., the Eastern District 
of Washington found that section 113(h) denied the court jurisdiction 
to hear an action brought under the Resource and Recovery 
Conservation Act (RCRA).281  The court characterized the 
interagency agreement designed to comply with RCRA and CERCLA 
as “a single integrated CERCLA remedial plan,” therefore barring any 
RCRA enforcement actions.282 
Private parties seeking CERCLA’s full remedy to recover from a 
chemical release must strategize timing when bringing claims under 
different statutes.  While timing for cleanup of a federal facility is at 
least de jure easier under Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. California 
EPA, cleanup on nonfederal property in the Ninth Circuit and in other 
circuits should be coordinated with FTCA and any other statutory 
remedy.283  To prevent the risk of having a claim barred by a statute 
of limitations, a party would need to file an administrative action 
first.284  Completing preparation before filing the claim will greatly 
assist in settlement.  It would also be important to file the claim for 
the cleanup of private lands prior to entering into a settlement that 
may prevent later challenge under § 9613(h).285  The time required to 
discover the harm and file the administrative claim may push the 
statute of limitations of the administrative action, making timely 
follow up from an incident a significant part of obtaining the 
maximum recovery possible. 
In addition to response costs, CERCLA’s natural resource damages 
provisions provide for restoration of injured, destroyed, or lost natural 
resources, including the reasonable costs of a damage assessment.286  
The measure of damages is the cost of restoring injured resources to 
their baseline condition, compensation for the interim loss of injured 
resources pending recovery, and the reasonable cost of a damage 
 
280 40 C.F.R. § 307.20(a) (2009). 
281 820 F. Supp. 1265, 1283 (E.D. Wash. 1993). 
282 Id. at 1279, 1283.  The court found there was a comprehensive CERCLA cleanup 
under sections 104 and 120.  Id. at 1283; see supra text accompanying note 255 regarding 
applying the section 113(h) bar to actions against federal facilities. 
283 See 189 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1999). 
284 See 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (2006). 
285 See generally Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 1669 (2009). 
286 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). 
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assessment.287  The statute requires the President to notify the 
appropriate natural resource trustees of potential damage to natural 
resources resulting from releases under CERCLA investigation.288  
Natural resource trustees are responsible for restoring injured natural 
resources.  The two major areas of trustee responsibility under 
CERCLA are the assessment of injury to natural resources and the 
restoration of natural resources injured or services lost due to a 
release or discharge.289 
To meet these responsibilities, the statute provides several 
mechanisms.  The trustees can sue in court to obtain compensation 
from the PRPs for natural resource damages and the costs of 
assessment and restoration planning.290  The trustees can also 
participate in negotiations with PRPs to obtain PRP-financed or PRP-
conducted assessments and restorations of natural resource 
damages.291  CERCLA also expressly allows any person to bring a 
citizen suit against any party, including the United States or any 
governmental agency, who violates CERCLA.292  Breaching any of 
the provisions of an agreement under section 120 that relate to federal 
facilities may also constitute a violation, though the claim would not 
be for money damages, but for ensuring compliance with the 
CERCLA mandate.  This provision waives the sovereign immunity of 
the United States, making the government liable as any private person 
would be for releases of contaminants.293  The statute includes 
individuals, corporations, states, municipalities, and other entities in 
its definition of a “person” who may bring a citizen suit against the 
United States.294  However, note that any suit brought under CERCLA 
against a state must overcome the precedent established in Seminole 
 
287 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (2009). 
288 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2006).  “Natural resource trustee” under CERCLA “means any 
[f]ederal natural resources management agency designated in the NCP and any [s]tate 
agency designated by the Governor of each [s]tate, pursuant to section 107(f)(2)(B) of 
CERCLA, that may prosecute claims for damages under section 107(f) or 111(b) of 
CERCLA; or an Indian tribe, that may commence an action under section 126(d) of 
CERCLA.”  43 C.F.R. § 11.14(rr).  Rather than wait for notification, if a possible natural 
resource trustee is aware of a chemical release, that possible trustee should assert 
trusteeship in good faith. 
289 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). 
290 Id. § 9613. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. § 9659(a). 
293 Id. § 9659(a)(1). 
294 Id. § 9601(21). 
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Tribe of Florida v. Florida; for all claims except Fourteenth 
Amendment violations, a state must have waived its sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
before it can be sued in federal court.295  Therefore, a potential 
plaintiff should look to state hazardous substances law for recovery 
from the state.  CERCLA includes a national security exemption for 
Department of Energy or Department of Defense federal facilities, 
which consists of an order from the President regarding a specific site 
for up to one year and renewable yearly.296 However, no exemption 
may be made due to lack of appropriation unless the President 
specifically requested it and Congress failed to make the 
appropriation.297 
B.  Emergency Response Costs 
Local governments can seek EPA reimbursement for certain 
emergency response costs.298  The EPA will accept only one 
reimbursement request for a single response, which includes all of the 
temporary emergency measures that all local governments or agencies 
conduct in response to a single hazardous substance release.299  States, 
however, may not request such reimbursement.300  Also, local 
governments can receive up to $25,000 to help lighten financial 
burdens related to emergency response to hazardous waste substance 
releases, and this reimbursement does not replace funding that local 
governments normally provide for emergency response.301  Allowable 
costs include disposable materials and supplies acquired to use in 
response to the incident, rental of equipment used to respond to the 
specific incident, decontamination of equipment contaminated during 
the response, laboratory costs of analyzing samples taken during the 
response, and evacuation costs.302 
 
295 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
296 42 U.S.C. § 9620(j) (2006). 
297 Id. 
298 40 C.F.R. § 310.1 (2009). 
299 Id. § 310.6. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. § 310.1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9623 (2006). 
302 40 C.F.R. § 310.11; cf. id. § 310.12. 
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C.  Cost Recovery 
Federal law and Oregon’s cost recovery law authorize private 
parties that incur cleanup costs to seek contribution from other 
responsible parties;303 however, the state of the law in this area is 
driven by case law and is uncertain.  The Ninth Circuit has recognized 
an implied right of contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 9607.304  “Right of 
contribution” means that a PRP is responsible only for that portion of 
the liability it equitably should bear and is entitled to hold other PRPs 
severally, or individually, liable for each of their respective, equitable 
shares of the total costs.305  Under the federal scheme, however, as 
interpreted in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, a PRP may not 
seek contribution under CERCLA from another PRP unless the 
federal government has previously initiated a civil action under 42 
U.S.C. § 9606, or § 9607.306  Aviall demonstrated a disincentive for a 
private party to assume cleanup with the idea that it could then ask for 
contribution from another PRP.  However, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Aviall does not affect the right of any person to bring a 
state law claim for remedy.  For example, any party can seek 
contribution under Oregon’s environmental cleanup law.307 
IV 
TRIBAL RECOVERY OPTIONS 
The presence of an Indian tribe’s interest presents other options for 
community recovery in the event of a chemical release from a federal 
facility.  Under Oregon and federal law, tribes must be included in the 
planning and implementation of recovery efforts.308  In addition to 
fulfilling a legal mandate, the inclusion of the tribes serves a practical 
purpose as well: it furthers the policy of having government-to-
government relations with each Indian tribe, a policy that both 
 
303 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.257 (2009). 
304 Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997), 
overruled by United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007), as recognized 
in Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., 523 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2008). 
305 See Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 162–63 (2004). 
306 Id. at 164–65. 
307 OR. REV. STAT. § 465.325(6)(a) (2009). 
308 See Policy on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal 
Governments, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,255, 42,255–56 (Aug. 14, 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
182.164, 190.110 (2009). 
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Oregon and the United States have adopted.309  An excellent example 
of this government-to-government relationship in practice is the 
UMAD CSEPP site, which is unique in that it is the only CSEPP site 
in the country that involves the formal and active participation of an 
Indian tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation (CTUIR).310  The CTUIR entered Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with the Army and local governments 
defining aspirations, roles, and responsibilities regarding the federal 
facility at UMAD, which is in the process of incinerating a stockpile 
of chemical weapons.311  Contrast this with the Tooele Army Depot, 
which operates a demilitarization program of a far larger percentage 
of the national stockpile of chemical weapons near the Goshute Indian 
reservations.312  Restricting use of tribal resources may be viewed as 
abrogating treaty rights.313  In addition to the sovereign status of 
tribes, the rural location of a site and presence of an Indian tribe 
triggers responsibilities under federal law314 and serves to implement 
state and federal environmental justice policies.315  Tribes may be 
 
309 See Policy on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal 
Governments, 61 Fed. Reg. at 42,255–56; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 182.164, 190.110. 
310 OREGON CSEPP, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT (2007), available at http://www.csepp.net/ 
_reports_/2007_ORCSEPP_Annual_Report.pdf. 
311 See OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 2006 ANNUAL GOVERNMENT-TO-
GOVERNMENT REPORT ON TRIBAL RELATIONS 8–9 (2006), available at 
http://www.deq.state.or.us/programs/tribal/2006TribalReport.pdf. 
312 See Tooele Army Depot (TEAD), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/ 
tooele.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). 
313 See Allen Sedik, Nat’l Resource Damage Assessment & Restoration Program 
Manager, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Remarks at the Law Seminars International 
Conference on Natural Resource Damages: New Developments and Emerging Strategies 
(July 17, 2008). 
314 See generally Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).  This is 
particularly relevant because six of nine CSEPP sites have a history of polluting and 
impacting a disproportionate number of minorities and people living below the poverty 
level.  SUZANNE MARSHALL, KY. ENVTL. FOUND., CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1996), http://www.cwwg.org/EJ.html.  Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act has been invoked to address environmental justice.  See Scott Michael Edson, 
Note, Title VI or Bust? A Practical Evaluation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as 
an Environmental Justice Remedy, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 141 (2004).  Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person in the United States shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.”).  
The EPA regulations associated with Title VI create a process for private individuals to 
file administrative complaints if they believe they have suffered discrimination in violation 
of EPA’s regulations.  40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (2009). 
315 Or. Exec. Order No. EO-97-16 (Aug. 1, 1997); S.B. 420, 74th Or. Legis. Assem. 
(Or. 2007); MARSHALL, supra note 314. 
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designated as natural resource trustees under CERCLA, and the 
statute affords tribes an extended statute of limitations period.316 
The federal government has a trust responsibility to Indian tribes, 
and common law shapes the extent of the federal government’s 
obligation.  In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I),317 United States 
v. Mitchell (Mitchell II),318 United States v. Navajo Nation,319 and 
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,320 the Supreme Court 
created an analytic framework for determining the government’s 
obligation in specific instances.321  Given the high level of regulation 
and responsibility of the federal government over federal facilities, it 
is important to examine whether a chemical release would trigger this 
trust responsibility.  An Indian tribe generally has the same rights 
against the federal government as any other person under the 
FTCA.322  However, one court has held that an Indian tribe may bring 
an FTCA action against the United States in a parens patriae 
capacity.323 
Under CERCLA, an Indian tribe based in the area impacted by the 
release would likely be designated a natural resource trustee for 
natural resources belonging to, managed by, controlled by, 
appertaining to, or held in trust for the benefit of such tribe, or 
belonging to a member of such tribe if the resources are subject to a 
trust restriction on alienation.324  In Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, 
Inc., the Tribe was trustee for all of the lands within its reservation.325  
In the case of the UMAD, assuming the release occurred on federal 
land within the boundaries of UMAD, a chemical release could 
impact the surrounding area, including the Columbia River, which 
 
316 42 U.S.C. § 9626(d) (2006) (giving tribes effectively an additional two years beyond 
the period applicable to federal trustees in most cases). 
317 445 U.S. 535 (1980). 
318 463 U.S. 206 (1983). 
319 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
320 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
321 See supra notes 317–20. 
322 See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180–82 (1956) (imposing liability for 
damages in a suit brought under the FTCA by eight Navajo families whose horses, which 
were grazing on public lands of the United States, were destroyed by federal agents). 
323 Quechan Indian Tribe v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1116–17 (S.D. Cal. 
2008). 
324 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2006). 
325 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 (D. Idaho 2003), modified in part sub nom. United 
States v. Asarco, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Idaho 2005). 
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tribal members access to exercise treaty rights, such as treaty fishing 
rights.326  The CTUIR would likely be a natural resource trustee.  A 
tribe serving as a natural resource trustee may change the damages 
analysis since valuation methods may not be appropriate for tribal use 
of resources and the standards of food consumption may not be 
appropriate to the Indian population.327 
Various federal laws protect cultural resources and provide 
statutory tools for tribes and others advocating tribal rights to cultural 
resources.  Agencies also have their own specific policies vis-à-vis 
tribes and cultural resources.  The EPA’s Indian policy includes 
provisions ensuring protection of cultural resources.328  The 
Department of the Army’s policy on cultural resources is to “[e]nsure 
that installations make informed decisions regarding the cultural 
resources under their control in compliance with public laws, in 
support of the military mission, and consistent with sound principles 
of cultural resources management.”329  In fact, the Army regulations 
cite a list of federal laws that apply to the Army Cultural Resources 
Management Program.330 
 
326 Treaty Between the United States and the Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla 
Tribes and Bands of Indians in Washington and Oregon Territories, proclaimed April 11, 
1859, 12 Stat. 945.  Documents such as the Response Plan refer to this ceded land; further 
analysis is needed to determine what rights the Tribe could enforce regarding UMAD land. 
327 Sedik, supra note 313.  For example, changing fish consumption standards due to 
CTUIR efforts.  The Oregon Environmental Quality Commission unanimously approved 
the DEQ “to pursue rule revisions that will set new water quality standards for toxic 
pollutants in Oregon.  The new standards will be based on a new ‘fish consumption rate’ 
that is much more protective of human health than the existing rate.”  Press Release, State 
of Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Environmental Quality Commission Approves New “Fish 
Consumption” Rate for Revising Water Quality Standards (Oct. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.deq.state.or.us/news/prDisplay.asp?docID=2770.  Accounting for cultural use 
of natural resources by tribes in damages determinations has been a discussion topic in the 
Department of the Interior.  See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 2 (2006), 
available at http://restoration.doi.gov/pdf/facamtg4_summary.pdf.  For scientific 
information on cultural use of natural resources, see BARBARA L. HARPER ET AL., OR. ST. 
U., REGIONAL TRIBAL EXPOSURE SCENARIOS BASED ON MAJOR ECOLOGICAL ZONES 
AND TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE LIFESTYLES (2007), http://www.hhs.oregonstate.edu/ 
ph/tribal-grant-main-page. 
328 WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, EPA, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/tribal/pdf/indian-policy-leavitt-pr.pdf. 
329 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. NO. 200-1, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT 28 (2007) [hereinafter AR 200-1], 
available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r200_1.pdf. 
330 Id. 
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At the present time, and any time the Army or any federal agency 
would take action with regard to a chemical release from the UMAD, 
the agency must comply with these statutes; one prominent example 
of this type of statute is the NHPA.331  The purpose of the NHPA is to 
preserve the history and prehistory of this country by protecting 
historical and cultural properties.332  Section 470(f) of the NHPA 
requires federal agencies to consider the impact of “their undertakings 
on historic properties.”333  During the section 470(f) process, the 
agency must “identify historic properties potentially affected by the 
undertaking, assess its effects and seek ways to avoid, minimize or 
mitigate any adverse effects on historic properties.”334 
Implementing CERCLA, however, may interfere and even prevent 
implementing the NHPA.  In Boarhead Corporation v. Erickson, 
section 113(h) was found to bar claims under the NHPA during the 
remedial investigation/feasibility study phase of CERCLA cleanup.335  
The best option is to begin and continue negotiations regarding 
cultural resources, which would, at a minimum, lead to a cultural 
resources inventory of properties protected by the NHPA. This would 
be in compliance with the NHPA and would take place before an 
event occurs that forces further federal agency action. 
In the event of a chemical release, in order to ensure protection of 
cultural resources, a settlement could explicitly include provisions 
reflecting the EPA’s Indian policy.336  Agreements may include 
provisions for protection of cultural resources and specifically 
incorporate a departmental policy, such as the Army policy regarding 
cultural resources.  In the meantime, MOUs and other collaborative 
agreements made between tribes, other entities, and the federal 
government may include provisions to inventory and assess the 
cultural resources at a federal facility. 
 
331 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x-6 (2006).  Although Army regulations explicitly 
implement the duties of various federal statutes applying to cultural resources, AR 200-1, 
supra note 329, the Army has yet to consult with CTUIR, let alone do any planning with 
regard to cultural resources and the Umatilla Army Depot.  Interview with Teara Farrow, 
CTUIR Cultural Resources Program Manager (Sept. 19, 2008). 
332 16 U.S.C. § 470(b). 
333 36 C.F.R. 800.1(a) (2009) (referring to 16 U.S.C. § 470). 
334 Id. 
335 Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (involving an NHPA 
complaint that EPA failed to conduct a section 106 review as required under NHPA and 
that regulations did not meet any of the five exceptions to CERCLA’s section 113(h) 
withdrawal of federal jurisdiction during CERCLA cleanup action). 
336 See RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 328. 
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V 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROACTIVE PREPARATION 
Recent research states that “4,618 [Department of Defense] 
installations will require environmental cleanup.”337  Although in 
recent years there has been more pressure to use the national security 
exemption in federal environmental laws to avoid the requirements of 
those laws,338 there are opportunities to prepare for recovery from a 
chemical release.  Funding cleanup of the many installations is likely 
a lower priority given current armed conflicts that also requiring 
funding, but recent stimulus funding provides an additional 
possibility.339  Also, the CSEPP process provides a framework where 
some proactive planning has taken place, and may include more 
guidance in the future which may also aid in recovery in non-CSEPP 
related incidents.  Ultimately, it is the engagement of those who stand 
to be injured by a chemical release, prior to such an event, that 
enables the best proactive planning. 
Communities, private companies, and individuals have several 
tools at their disposal that would allow for recovery in the event a 
chemical release affects them or their property, real or personal.  The 
Stafford Act is an important first tool to consider, though litigants 
would need to establish at the outset of a case that a chemical release 
triggered the Act’s provisions.  Maximizing recovery under this law 
requires coordinating claims from the release if it is considered one 
incident.  The Army claims process, the FTCA, and the MCA provide 
the basis for legal claims against the federal government and allow for 
damage payments for personal injury and property damage.  
 
337 De Saillan, supra note 5, at 46 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13, 14 
figs.15, 16, & 17 (2007), available at https://www.denix.osd.mil/portal/page/portal/ 
denix/environment/ARC/FY2006DEP/Defense%20Environmental%20Programs_1.pdf).  
Note, for example, the additional five billion dollars recently allocated to clean up the 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009.  Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 201, 123 Stat. 115, 140 (2009). 
338 Id. at 47.  Stephen Dycus expressed a different interpretation of the military’s 
attention to environmental matters.  DYCUS, supra note 65, passim.  Dycus states that 
government officials responsible for the nation’s defense have become far more sensitive 
in recent years to the importance of faithful compliance with environmental laws, and have 
learned that pollution prevention costs less than cleaning up later and protects the 
environment for future generations.  Id. at 187.  In a more recent article, Professor Dycus 
describes the opposite trend emerging.  See Stephen Dycus, Osama’s Submarine: National 
Security and Environmental Protection After 9/11, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1 passim (2005). 
339 De Saillan, supra note 5, at 46. 
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Recovering from environmental damage and restoring natural 
resources require DERA funds triggered by CERCLA.  A great deal 
of coordination may be necessary given the CERCLA restriction of 
judicial review during CERCLA remediation, unless one is dealing 
with a matter of a federal facility located in the Ninth Circuit and can 
rely upon the Fort Ord opinion.  And, it may be that a settlement 
remains the preferred alternative to remediate the land.  In any case, a 
timely filing of the administrative action is necessary and wise to 
preserve the possibility of recovery under the FTCA. 
At the same time, other federal environmental statutes and various 
state statutes provide remedy against private parties, such as a 
government contractor who acts outside of the protections of a 
government contract through willful or bad faith conduct.  Further, 
remedies available to others, such as Indian tribes, may benefit the 
local communities in the affected area by offering added tools to 
restore natural resources, protect cultural resources, and enforce rights 
to protect persons and property. 
Rinaldo Campana exhorts attorneys “to engage and interact” with 
all of the agencies because that will allow attorneys “to set out the 
legal responsibilities and procedural requirements that local 
governments, private companies and [their] employees need to follow 
before, during, and after an incident.”340  Limitations of the various 
statutes, court interpretations of these statutes, timing issues, and 
other restrictions provide good reasons to include legal recovery for a 
possible chemical release alongside other health and emergency 
preparedness exercises. 
 
340 Campana, supra note 22, at 251. 
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